2013 was not a bad year for the U.S. in the Middle East. It was able to restart Israel-Palestine negotiations in July, persuade Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to sign an agreement to remove chemical weapons in September, and negotiate an interim deal with Iran on its nuclear policy in November.

Despite these achievements, the U.S. continues to become more of a reactionary power in the region. It seems likely that its Middle East policy will change significantly, which will have profound implications on China's Middle East policy.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the U.S., under former presidents George Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, actively tried – and succeeded to varying degrees – to dictate Middle East politics. Now some analysts believe that, in comparison, current U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is just troubleshooting, whether it be for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Syrian crisis or Iran's nuclear energy program. There is no longer an overarching framework guiding the resolution of all these problems.

Most notably, as the Arab Spring unfolded, the U.S. remained a passive observer. Its role in Egyptian politics has been overestimated – it did not steer the direction of Egyptian domestic politics. In Libya, the U.S. simply followed the EU in regards to military intervention; and similarly, it was reluctant to meddle in the Syrian civil war. The U.S. also turned a deaf ear to other domestic demonstrations in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf.

There are several reasons that the U.S. has become more reactionary. It is now more reluctant to invest as much resources in a region where its interests are declining as an increase in domestic shale gas production provides some energy independence. It also has redirected some resources in its "pivot to Asia" policy, further limiting its capabilities in the Middle East.