A potential military attack against Syria's Assad regime is looming as the U.S. and the West have already started their anti-Assad media campaign. However, the final decision rests with the U.S.. The most crucial will be the U.S. perception of whether the opposition could survive a strike on the regime's forces.

Both Americans and Europeans are vehemently blaming Bashar Assad's regime for gassing its people. The argument that Assad is poisoning his own people might be accepted by a significant number of people, particularly in the West, but it is poorly based. Chemical weapons, like other weapons of mass destructions (WMD), are usually used as a last resort. A conflicting party would only use them when facing defeat.

This was certainly not the case with the current Syrian government forces. In the last few months, Assad's regime has won over the opposition. The reoccupation of Qusair, a strategic border town, made him confident about his political career. So why then would he use chemical weapons?

It is true that Assad has a weak legitimacy to rule, since he inherited power from his father not through elections. It is true that serious humanitarian crisis have taken place in Syria. There have been more than 100,000 casualties in the last two and a half years. But neither of these facts provides solid evidence for Assad's cruelty. If his regime is truly as cruel as the West describes, far more serious humanitarian crisis would have happened.

The current Syrian crisis is more geopolitical than humanitarian, though U.S. military interventions are always in the name of human rights. The reason why the U.S. does not like Assad's regime is because the regime is allied with Iran, which the U.S. regards as an arch enemy. The U.S. should be equally anxious to intervene in other Middle East countries with similar problems. But it is not.

It is not too relevant which side used chemical weapons. The prospect of fighting in Syria is more crucial. The real cause of war against Assad actually lies in the victories the regime has achieved in the last months. If the opposition is irreversibly defeated, the West's hope for Assad's final collapse would become dimmer, which is the outcome the West is not willing to see. Therefore, a potential military intervention would be the West trying to prevent the immediate defeat of the opposition.

The collapse of the opposition, is not in the West's interests, but it does not mean the West would naturally favor the opposition. The U.S. has been very prudent about whether to intervene or not, despite its double standards. They have learned from previous interventions.

Firstly, it is easier to destroy an old order but never easy to create a new one. Secondly, a new political force coming to power does not necessarily serve the interests of the U.S. and the West. The case of Egypt is indicative. Thirdly, a failed state can more easily turn into a harbor for global terrorists. What's more, Al Qaeda elements are actually a significant part of the Syrian opposition.

The war, if it is really coming, should be a limited one. Though the U.S. has been very clear that it does not want Assad in power, it is not certain which political force will take over Syria, and it is even not certain whether Al Qaeda will shelter there.

It is highly likely that the U.S. will take a nuanced approach to Syria. Neither the collapse of the regime or the opposition is in its interests. The problem is whether the U.S. and the West can really keep such a balance. A strike against the regime, even if limited, might cause its immediate bankruptcy. In that case, Syria might become another Iraq or Libya. The regime has been under tremendous external and internal pressures for more than two years. Its vulnerability is clear.

Peaceful negotiations would produce the best outcome for Syria. Judging by the complexity of the conflicts, neither side could achieve a total victory. The distribution of political power in a future Syria should be based on the current balance of power.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

http://china.org.cn/opinion/jinliangxiang.htm

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