A man raises a poster of Iran's former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani to celebrate his victory at the presidential election on a street in Tehran, Iran, June 15, 2013. [Ahmad Halabisaz/Xinhua]

Moderate cleric Hassan Rowhani swept into office following the first round of voting in Iran's 11th presidential election, taking more than 50 percent of the vote according to the country's interior ministry. Rowhani's election will bring to an end the era of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's radical style of diplomacy and will usher in an era of moderate foreign policy, though the changes will likely not be substantial.

The West tends to regard Iran's political system as a product of a backward religious revolution. However, the Islamic Republic is not only "Islamic" but also a "republic" and since its founding, the debate has centered on the extent to which it should be both Islamic and a republic. This debate finally resulted in the departure of the conservatives and reformists and pragmatic conservatives, whom the West would like to label moderates while Iranians dub them centrists, stay in the middle. Hassan Rowhani is from the pragmatic conservative camp.

Since the late 1990s, pragmatic conservatives headed by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and reformists headed by Mohammad Khatami have been united in a political coalition to fight the conservatives, who control the country's major government institutions. Both the pragmatic conservatives and reformists attach great importance to improving Iran's economic situation as well as the country's relations with its neighbors and the West. This shared economic and foreign policy vision has laid the foundation for cooperation between the two sides.

The coalition has proved to be effective. Khatami's elections as president in 1997 and 2001 respectively were in no small part due to the support of Rafsanjani's pragmatic conservative faction. Despite the coalition's failure to bring Mir-Hossein Mousavi to presidential power in 2009, it has triumphed this time in propelling Rowhani to the presidency.

Iran, after eight years of reformist presidential rule and another eight years of conservative presidential rule, finally has a president regarded by the country as a centrist and by the West as a moderate conservative. This change, however, does not necessarily mean that policy will alter significantly and this is due to the way in which power is structured in Iran.

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, supreme power rests with the Supreme Leader, not the president. As Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei enjoys both the highest religious prestige and control of the country's national military forces. As a result, he has the power to directly intervene in the process of nominating candidates to major government posts and has the final say on major domestic and foreign policy issues. Therefore, Khamenei has sufficient political resources to maintain the consistency of Iran's domestic and foreign policy.

What's more, a pragmatic president cannot change the general conservatism of Iran's domestic politics and this is due to how institutional power is held in the country. With the exception of the administrative power held by the president, Iran's parliament, Judiciary, Guardian Council and the Supreme National Security Council are all under the control of conservatives. There is no doubt that, because of this, Rowhani will have to fight all of these bodies in the coming four years in order to get his policies through, and conflicts between administrative power and the powers of other bodies will intensify.

On the other hand, once elected and recognized by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, Rowhani's presidency will be legal and he will therefore, like his predecessors Khatami and Ahmaninejad, enjoy modest but significant leeway for pursuing his own policies.

From 2003 to 2005, Rowhani was the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran's top nuclear negotiator. Under his stewardship, Iran signed the additional protocol of the Non-proliferation Treaty, and Paris Agreements, as a result of mediation from the UK, France and Germany. At one stage, Iran's suspension of its nuclear enrichment activities under the terms of the agreement led to the easing of nuclear tensions.

Due to various restrictions, Rowhani will not likely go too far on the nuclear issue, but he will have to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach both to break through Iran's diplomatic isolation and improve the external environment for domestic economic development. Fortunately, he has the willingness to do so.

Conservatives in Iran still regard the U.S. as "the Great Satan." It is perhaps unlikely that Rowhani will be able to fulfill his election promise of improving Iran's relations with the U.S. It should, however, be an easier task for him to improve Iran's relations with Europe and neighboring Gulf Arab countries.

It is also worth mentioning that Ahmadinejad's diplomatic style will be consigned to the dustbin of history. Academics would like to categorize Ahmadinejad as a conservative, but it seems more reasonable to describe him as a radical populist judging by his frequent rhetoric that Israel should be wiped from the map. Generally speaking, Iran is basically a rational nation with occasional radical tendencies. Ahmadinejad's presidency should come to be seen as a historical footnote and Rowhani's election will finally turn the page on that chapter of Iranian history.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

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