By Fu Mengzi
Sino-US relations plummeted to freezing point in early 2001 in
the wake of a US spy plane colliding with a Chinese fighter
jet.
China was at the time regarded as a "strategic rival" by some
Americans. Then came the September 11 terrorist attacks. The
bilateral ties warmed up significantly because both sides had
common needs to fight against terrorism and also because the United
States woke up to the real threat to its security.
Some China experts in the United States believed that the
September 11 terror assaults marked the beginning of Sino-American
ties taking a turn for the better.
Others thought the turning point began with the United States
granting China permanent normal trade relations status.
Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, however, once
remarked that economic relations had long been the bedrock for
fluctuating China-US ties.
Looking back, one finds that the bilateral economic ties have
not necessarily danced to the tempo of the Chinese-US political
relations, which swing like a pendulum between good and bad.
In the mid-1980s, for example, China, which was beginning to
open up to the outside world, did not command enough attention from
US corporate giants, though general China-US relations were very
good.
After the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, China's importance
in the US global strategy declined. As a result, China-US relations
slid into a period in which the bilateral ties were ill defined,
compounded by other factors.
The general bilateral ties were haunted by a host of unpleasant
events former Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui's US tour, crisis across
the Taiwan Straits, annual debate on extending to China the most
favored nation status, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade and so on. All this rendered both sides' efforts to bring
about a strategic partnership a short-lived flash of hope.
In the meantime, however, Sino-US economic relations were making
impressive advances, free from the interference of the swinging
political relationship.
In the whole of the 1990s, for instance, the trade volume
between the two sides expanded fivefold.
With Shanghai's Pudong Area opening up, American corporate
giants, chafing at the lack of opportunities, rushed into China and
brought with them millions of dollars in investment.
It is this irresistible force in the quest for profits that has
become a vitally important factor cementing China-US relations. Now
that the Chinese economy is moving ahead on a fast track, both
sides are becoming increasingly dependent on each other
economically.
In the past, US lawmakers, during debates in Congress, generally
believed that China needed the United States more than the United
States needed China.
But things have changed. In 2005, for instance, the Chinese-US
trade volume hit US$212 billion. China has now become the United
States' second largest trading partner after Canada, which means
that China, as a newly emerging big market, helps largely to
maintain US economic supremacy.
Although China enjoys a favorable balance in its trade with the
United States, a significant portion of it flows back to the US
market, buying US$200 billion worth of US treasury bonds. In this
sense, China also helps balance the United States' deficit in an
astronomical way.
A conclusion can, therefore, be drawn that the United States
very much needs China economically.
Closer trade relations mean more friction. As a matter of fact,
trade friction has been arising time and again from bilateral
trade. But at the same time, coordinating efforts are frequently
made. And, as a result, trade and economic issues have been saved
from plunging into the abyss of politicization.
Furthermore, the coordinating efforts in the course of handling
the disputes go beyond bilateral relations. For example, the United
States invited China's central bank governor and finance minister
to participate in the G8 finance ministers' conference earlier this
year because China is indispensable to coordinating the world
economy and financial markets.
True, the Chinese economy is much smaller than the US economy in
size. It is also smaller than the economies of Japan and the
members of the European Union. But it has a very big role to play
in the world economic arena.
The United States has long complained about the G8's
incompetence and inability and the appeal to bring about a "Group
of Four," referring to the United States, China, Japan and Europe,
is heard from time to time. Some even go so far as to suggest: "Why
not a G2?" Indeed, the Chinese and US economies, as the twin
engines powering the world economy, are supposed to shoulder more
responsibilities for setting the "roadmap" and "traffic rules" for
the development of the global economy and trade.
Although political interests override everything else in some
cases, trade and economic interests are, however, an integral part
of these political interests.
To put it frankly, if Taiwan declared independence, and in the
worst-case scenario the Chinese mainland used force to stop the
independence attempt, even if the United States got involved in the
conflict it would be dictated by its own interests, not by
Taiwan's. In his book "The Grand Chessboard," Zbigniew Brzezinski,
national security adviser to the Carter administration, says that
the United States' sympathy may be with Taiwan but is not for
Taiwan.
From a purely economic perspective, the cost of the armed
conflict between the two sides would go far beyond what the United
States is willing to bear. Many researchers have painted the
picture: The global stock and bond market would collapse, once the
spectre of the US-Chinese armed conflict was raised over Wall
Street, once the global monetary market sensed that China would
dump US treasury bonds, once the leaders of the transnational
corporate giants pictured in their minds the breaking down of the
global supply chains caused by US economic sanctions against China.
The leaders of the world countries and the corporate giants would
push Washington hard to take resolute action to defuse the
crisis.
Astute US politicians have sensed this kind of strategic risk
and realized that Sino-US relations should be viewed in a much
broader and long-term perspective. Economic factors are bound to
find expression in political decision-making, which means a strong
inherent driving force for the United States to keep Taiwanese
independence in check. This is not exclusively for the interests of
the Chinese mainland, but for the common good of both sides.
The author is a researcher with the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations.
(China Daily December 29, 2006)
