By Ruan Zongze
The US mid-term elections have dramatically changed the domestic
political landscape of the United States, with Democrats
controlling both chambers of the Congress. This renders George W.
Bush a "lame duck" president in the remainder of his
presidency.
The tipping of the power balance gives Democrats, the hardliners
in particular, more say on China policy in the United States. The
US Congress has long been a fertile breeding ground for "China
threat" theories.
Democrats are more concerned with human rights and trade affairs
and are critical of Republicans' free trade and "outsourcing"
policies. They advocate giving more support to US enterprises,
raising the minimum wage, boosting US enterprises' competitiveness
and are not so passionate about free trade. In view of all this, a
protectionist mentality could raise its head in the United
States.
US companies used to be the mainstay in maintaining good
US-China ties, but they are now becoming increasingly divided over
how to deal with China.
The corporate giants are still pushing for better US-China trade
ties because they have benefited a lot from doing business with
China. Small- and medium-sized enterprises, however, feel more
competition pressure from China than just reaping profits. The
combination of their influence and the liberal elements within the
Democratic Party could translate into pressure on US-China trade
matters. Consequently, voices criticizing China on issues of
revaluing the renminbi, intellectual property rights protection and
the environment could get louder.
Looking back at Bush's presidency, Sino-American relations first
underwent ups and downs in early 2001, but were soon back on a
normal track and have been faring quite well ever since.
The mid-air collision between a US Navy spy plane and a Chinese
fighter jet and the United States' sale of large quantities of arms
to Taiwan, which were compounded by the Bush government's intention
to distance itself from the Clinton administration in foreign
affairs, plunged Sino-US ties into an abyss.
The US decision-makers were treating China as a potential arch
rival when the September 11 terrorist attacks came as a telling
blow. The assaults made the US decision-makers see that the real
threat came from international terrorism, not from China.
The United States and China had many shared interests in staging
an anti-terror campaign. Consequently, Chinese-American relations
embarked on a road of smooth development. This fairly long period
of smooth ties has helped expand the areas on which both sides'
interests converge.
Chinese and US leaders have met frequently. Last year, a channel
of "strategic dialogue" was opened between the two countries. The
mechanism of "strategic economic dialogue" was introduced this
year.
It is safe to say that good US-China ties go beyond the
bipartisan interests in the United States. During the Clinton
presidency, for instance, China and the United States became
"strategic partners."
China-US relations today have matured and their shock-absorbing
capacity has increased. A particular issue cropping up in a
particular area is not expected to mess up the framework of the
China-US relationship as a whole. This means the solid foundation
for future cooperation is already in place. Cooperative programs
and dealings at various levels in a wide range of sectors have
bounded the huge interests of the two sides closely together.
?
China sticks to the road of peaceful development and, as a result,
this basic strategy requires that Chinese diplomacy serves domestic
progress towards a well-off society. All this signifies that China
needs an open international system, stability on its peripheries
and good relations with other big countries. This orientation
largely tallies with the direction dictated by the basic interests
of the United States.
Also, US allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region are
reluctant to see Washington pursue a confrontational China policy.
The last thing they want is to be forced to choose between China
and the United States.
Stable US-China ties are in the interests of the United States
because Washington can thus spare much energy and efforts for other
major issues. For example, the United States currently has three
hot potatoes in its hands Iraq, Iran's nuclear bidding, and the
nuclear issue of North Korea. All these problems, the latter two in
particular, need China's cooperation, among other things.
The United States' China policy is likely to be punctuated by a
host of questions.
First, how will the United States re-chart its China policy in
the face of many uncertainties? This involves: What kind of changes
do the United States hope to see taking place in China? Is the
United States convinced that China's goal in Asia is to whittle
away US strength and influence in the region or drive it out from
Asia altogether? Will the United States retain its competitive edge
in a world where China is getting increasingly stronger? All these
questions point to one thing: The United States harbors profound
misgivings about China's development.
A body of opinion in the United States goes so far as to assume
that China's rise to the status of a world-class power constitutes
one of the two major challenges faced by US diplomacy in the 21st
century, with the other being how to effectively stave off violence
launched by Islamic fundamentalism.
Preoccupied with all these worries and absorbed in weighing
disadvantages against advantages, the United States has ignored
mapping out a long-term strategy dealing with China.
It might be against this background that the United States is
reconsidering if the statement that "a powerful, prosperous and
open China is welcome" should still remain valid. As a matter of
fact, Washington does not so much want to see a powerful China as a
China enjoying stability. Washington also worries that a powerful
Chinese mainland does no good to Taiwan. Hence arms sales to the
island.
In addition, the United States has mixed feelings towards "a
prosperous China." The good thing is that bilateral trade and
investment keep rising. The bad thing is the so-called "unfair
competition" from China.
In addition, the Taiwan question will pose a negative factor
haunting Sino-American ties for a long time to come. Now and the
coming two years will be a crucial period when something very bad
could turn up. Chen Shui-bian, for example, is striving to leave
his political legacy by trumpeting the creation of Taiwan's "new
constitution." He is actually challenging Sino-US ties as well as
the Chinese mainland.
Some uncertainties could also have a negative impact on China-US
relations. The rise of neo-nationalism in Japan, for one, is a
factor that affects regional stability. Also, numerous
uncertainties exist in China-Japan relations and the process of
reconciliation is bound to be long and painful.
By all accounts, both sides are still mistrustful of one
another's long-term goals, despite China-US relations developing to
cover wide areas and the two sides' interdependence on each other
growing. The mutual distrust serves only to reinforce the argument
that the conflicts between the United States and China are bound to
occur and that preparations, therefore, should be made for
that.
This gives rise to the situation that both sides are pursuing a
policy of hedging their bets while seeking constructive engagement.
In view of all this, expanding the positive aspects in China-US
ties and clearing away suspicion and mistrust constitutes an
important task ahead of both sides.
The author is deputy director of the China Institute of
International Studies.
(China Daily November 23, 2006)
