From December 2005 to January 2006, the Core Group of Chinese
Experts involved in the "Northeast Asia Trialog Research Project,"
using a questionnaire jointly designed by scholars and experts from
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, conducted a survey among 30
Chinese individuals from business, academic, military, social,
media and government backgrounds. Its preliminary findings are
significant and deserve serious consideration.
The survey results show the respondents tend to hold a more
favorable impression of ROK in contrast to their negative view of
Japan. The positive perception of ROK can be generally attributed
to three factors in bilateral relations: ever-growing economic
co-operation, broad common understanding on issues such as past
Japanese invasion, and increasingly popular cultural exchanges.
The unfavorable view of Japan, meanwhile, has resulted from the
deterioration of political and security relations between China and
Japan in recent years, particularly Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. It should be noted
that even under such circumstances, up to 40 percent of the
respondents still believe China should further develop bilateral
ties with Japan.
With regard to the question of what is currently the most
important security issue in Northeast Asia, most of the respondents
regard Japan's persuit of military power as the major security
threat, and the cause of potential military confrontation.
The geopolitical reasons behind this include the factor of
potential competition between Japan and China that could cause
rivalry between the two countries; concerns about Japan's revision
of its Pacifist Constitution, the strengthening of Japan-US
alliance, and the faster pace at which Japan is sending troops
abroad; the Japanese right-wing's spreading of the "China threat"
theory to justify the country's military expansion and efforts to
become a military power. And also, for its own strategic interests,
the United States does not want to see strained Sino-Japanese
relations, but nevertheless it is bonding ever closer with Japan
and backing the latter's efforts to play a bigger role in regional
security in order to prevent or at least hinder China's rise.
In short, most respondents see Japan as trying to upset the
status quo and are concerned it will change its course of post-war
peaceful development. I believe it is reasonable for the Chinese
side to think so, but wish to point out that more definitive study
is needed to determine if the above concern will become reality.
Also it is necessary to analyze the negative impact on regional
security cast by the nuclear issue in North Korea as the danger of
it triggering military confrontation must not be overlooked.
On the issue of Northeast Asia economic co-operation and common
regional identity, the Chinese respondents have taken
"Sino-Japanese reconciliation" as the most critical precondition
for regional economic co-operation and believes political
leadership and willingness are the decisive factors in promoting
joint leadership by China and Japan in this regard.
As for Northeast Asia Free Trade Area (FTA), the Chinese
respondents hold a comparatively optimistic view. Two thirds of
them expect it to be set up in 10 years, while quite a few think it
is more feasible in the near future to form a Sino-Korean FTA. Most
of the Chinese respondents do not regard Russia as a major country
pushing forward Northeast Asia economic co-operation, but are still
willing to support Russia's entry in the NAFTA on certain
conditions.
The Chinese respondents see economic co-operation as the major
cornerstone for building up a common regional identity, and
considers energy and trade co-operation the most urgent area for
advancing bilateral and regional co-operation.
I believe the points mentioned above are quite practical and
demonstrate the sincere wish of the Chinese side to strengthen
regional economic co-operation and form a regional identity.
Particularly noteworthy and significant is the common
recognition of the necessity for Sino-Japanese reconciliation and
stronger energy co-operation, which will be a great driving force
behind regional economic co-operation if realized soon.
Most respondents think the rise of nationalism in Japan is the
strongest in the region. They have picked two reasons over others
for the rise of nationalism in the region: "the resentment towards
Japanese invasion and rule (or more precisely strong resentment
towards Japanese right-wing's whitewashing and denial of the
country's aggressionist past)" (40 percent), and "pride in economic
growth" (40 percent).
To me, these two are probably the main reasons for rising
nationalism among Chinese and Koreans, but they do not quite fit
into the Japan picture. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult
to determine which nation is witnessing the strongest rise of
nationalism at this moment. Normally, under the circumstances, one
would rely on intuition more than anything else when trying to
answer the question.
On how to improve Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese
respondents have listed "no more visits to Yasukuni Shrine" and "no
more meddling in Taiwan affairs" as well as "easing anti-Japan
sentiment in China" and "enhancing economic inter-dependency" as
top prerequisites for improving Sino-Japanese relations.
These choices, based on national interests, reflect their idea
of a pragmatic solution without compromising principles. They also
demonstrate the Chinese side's positive attitude towards resolving
major differences between the two countries and easing sentimental
confrontation between the two peoples. They basically echo relevant
policies made by the Chinese Government.
On how to enhance understanding and co-operation among China,
Japan and ROK, most of the Chinese respondents have picked "regular
summit meetings" as the most workable way for improving bilateral
relations between any two countries.
Currently there is no problem for China and ROK to conduct such
meetings, while those between ROK and Japan have been obstructed by
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, though
not yet totally suspended. China and Japan have not held any summit
meetings for over four years because of Koizumi's insistence on
visiting the shrine. And bilateral relations have been further
strained since last October, when all high-level contacts between
the two governments were suspended.
The only effective way to end this extremely abnormal situation,
which seriously hurts the bilateral ties between China and Japan
and between ROK and Japan, is for the Japanese prime minister to
give up visits to the Yasukuni Shrine once and for all. The
Japanese government leaders must understand it is not a choice of
submission to foreign pressure to stop visiting the shrine, but a
choice conducive to their own long-term interests.
In fact, the Japanese leaders' wrongful act has met with strong
opposition both at home and abroad. The sooner they stop doing it,
the sooner will the resumption of its high-level contacts with
China and ROK. This is not only what China and ROK hope for, but a
wish shared by more and more people in Japan as well.
The author is director of Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,
China Foundation For International and Strategic Studies.
(China Daily March 29, 2006)
