It will have significant implications for British foreign policy. All parties have committed to holding a Strategic Defense Review that will reassess foreign policy priorities and likely outline spending cuts in the diplomatic service and military. There will probably be a fierce debate over whether Britain should renew its costly nuclear deterrent.

This election is therefore likely to bring to an end an era when, under the "liberal interventionist" foreign policy of ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair, Britain engaged in a number of overseas military interventions, often in support of the United States. Any future government is likely to be less willing, or capable, of supporting similar expeditions.

Although it can be anticipated that the UK would maintain its commitment in Afghanistan, Britain can otherwise be expected to assume a reduced role in the world.

Does the election have more specific foreign policy implications for UK-China relations? There may be some concern in Beijing about the prospect of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government. Cameron controversially commented in the first leaders' television debate that the UK needed to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent because "we don't know what is going to happen with Iran, [and] we can't be certain of the future in China".

The Liberal Democrats are also the most likely to be reflexively sympathetic to Tibetan or human rights issues in Parliament.

Such concerns, however, would be exaggerated. I understand that in the debate Cameron meant to say the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, not China, and that apologies have been sent through appropriate channels. The Conservative Party's manifesto commits them to the consensus position of deepening engagement with Beijing and supporting an expansion of China's role in global institutions.

It is highly unlikely that the Liberals will be granted any control over foreign policy in any coalition deal.

Cameron visited China in 2007, a rare choice for an opposition leader and presumably designed to demonstrate that he grasps China's global importance. His likely choice as foreign minister, William Hague, is well-known in Beijing and there are a number of senior "China hands" within the Conservative ranks from the days of the Hong Kong handover negotiations.

Beijing may even welcome a change in government as an opportunity to move beyond the tensions that emerged following the contentious execution in China of British citizen Akmal Shaikh on accusations of drug smuggling.

The truth is that broader strategic questions that relate to UK-China relations can now only be effectively handled at the European-level. The hostility of the Conservative Party towards greater European integration is therefore not very helpful. It will likely undermine moves to bolster the EU's foreign policy capabilities so it can better represent itself to the rest of the world. It could also detract from much-needed efforts to develop a more unified and coherent China policy amongst member states.

Beijing may view this differently. China has traditionally supported greater European integration as a means of facilitating market access and offering a potential counter-balance to the US. But, at a time when the debate about China is turning increasingly negative in Europe, Beijing may view a Euro-skeptic Conservative administration as a useful ally.

The author is a visiting research fellow at Peking University's Center for International and Strategic Studies. He used to work for a MP in the UK Parliament.