What the Nuclear Security Summits have achieved is significant, but this is no time to be complacent. The results of the investigation after the terrorist attack in Brussels and Paris are pretty disturbing. There is some evidence that the terrorists behind both attacks may have planned something big. They videotaped a Belgian nuclear official who works at nuclear research sites with a wide range of nuclear and radiological materials; no one knows what they were after by monitoring this official. Two years ago, somebody with access to the Belgian reactor sabotaged it for reasons unknown to the authorities. Perhaps worse, one employee who once worked in the reactor and has access to the "vital areas" went to fight for the Islamic State. Once the terrorists obtain the nuclear and radiological materials, they may be able to fabricate a crude nuclear device or a dirty bomb to use for terrorism. Even after decades of efforts to improve nuclear security, no one is confident that future nuclear terrorism can be prevented.

With the transition of global governance of nuclear security from summit format to daily management, the joint communiqué and action plans in support of the United Nations, the IAEA, Interpol, and the multilateral regimes adopted in the last summit are good in theory, but how to implement these commitments and improve cooperation in practice is an open question.

Now it is time to double investment in nuclear security. This job should be done on two fronts: first, the states bear the fundamental responsibility to secure vulnerable materials and minimize the use of HEU, and second, the states should expand their cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism. That each sweeps the snow in front of the door is important, but many developing countries may have the will but not the ability to do so in a satisfactory way. Meanwhile, the United States and European countries have accumulated enough experiences, developed advanced technology and equipments necessary for nuclear security in the last two decades, hence, it is equally if not more important for them to come to help in this regard. Furthermore, the United States and Russia, the two superpowers possessing most of the HEU and plutonium, should minimize the use of HEU, and reduce their stockpile of both HEU and plutonium. Before asking others to do more, both countries should set a good example first. In promoting nuclear security, the developed and developing countries have common but differentiated responsibilities. Once countries fail to keep nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands, if there occur loss, theft, or other related criminal activities, how to share intelligence, cooperate to detect, intercept, disrupt, and defeat these activities will test all countries' political will. It is always easier said than done.

Now that there will not be another Nuclear Security Summit, it is time to translate political stances into concrete measures. In this context, the ending of the summit is also the beginning of substantial efforts and investment in nuclear security.

This article was first published at Chinausfocus.com To see the original version please visit http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/nuclear-security-the-end-of-the-beginning/

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

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