[By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]

The ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula will likely last for some time before North Korea tones down its rhetoric. According to Foreign Policy's incomplete statistics, North Korea has issued more than twenty warnings against the United States, South Korea, and other countries following international sanctions over its third nuclear test in February. However, there are limited signs indicating North Korea is matching its warnings with substantial military moves. Many commentators, bloggers, or even scholars working on Northeast Asia security issues did not take these warnings seriously, making jokes regarding these consecutive warnings. Escalation from North Korea is more or less rhetoric in substance.

This time the United States is doing business in quite a different way: Speak softly, and carry a big stick. In response to North Korea warnings and other moves, a White House spokesperson, the State Department and the Pentagon said that North Korean rhetoric was "unhelpful," "not constructive" and "concerning."

The U.S. matches moderate rhetoric with real military moves. In March, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the U.S. would install 14 additional ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska as a direct response to the North Korean threat. Other than the planned increase of interceptors in Alaska, the U.S. was preparing to deploy an advanced missile defense system known as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system to Guam. The U.S. Navy's two Aegis-equipped missile defense warships were deployed in this region too. The U.S. conducted annual joint drills "Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle" with South Korea, one way to display strength, preparedness and resolve. Washington also announced that B-52 bombers and B-2 stealth bombers made practice flight over South Korea, and the stealth fighters F-22s were sent to the U.S. Air Force Base in South Korea to support in the air drills.

Other than these military moves, the U.S. has had close consultation and very good cooperation with South Korea and Japan over any possible contingency on the Korean Peninsula. If there were no crisis like the current one, it would be mission impossible for the three countries to work together considering the history and territory disputes between South Korea and Japan. North Korea bridged them up. More importantly, the U.S. military also played the role of "enabler" as defined by its 2011 National Military Strategy, helping South Korea and Japan to build up their military capability in the name of responding to threats from North Korea.

The U.S. responded to North Korean rhetoric escalation in a substantial way. It sent out complicated signals to all countries concerned: to deter any possible provocation from North Korea, to assure both South Korea and Japan the credibility of American security commitment, to manage consequences of any contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The first two signals are nothing new, since the U.S. has been doing that for several decades, while the third signal indicates Obama administration's new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue: a shift from "Strategic Patience" to "Consequence Management."

Consequence Management on the Korean Peninsula is composed of three layers. Layer one is to constrain or delay the development of North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities by international sanctions and unilateral sanctions against North Korea. Sanctions help to block any efforts by North Korea to boost its military capabilities. The U.S. also gathered enough political support from all countries concerned to put pressure on North Korea. Layer two is to manage, respond any fallout of a provocative North Korea, including a display of strength, getting ready to fight a war if necessary, and assure its allies of the credibility of extended deterrence. Layer three is to intercept any possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from North Korea by cooperating with allies, or a coalition of willing.

Such a new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue shows that the U.S. has changed its threat assessment. The recent successful launch of a North Korean satellite, and the third nuclear test alarmed the U.S., and it is beginning to take security threats from the North more seriously. This change of threat assessment indicates the U.S. is getting very pessimistic of the future solution of a North Korean nuclear crisis by diplomacy. When the Leap Day Deal fell apart, the Obama administration lost faith in bilateral talks, not to mention multilateral ones; it just no longer believes diplomacy will work with North Korea. For the Obama administration, this approach is a pragmatic one. The initiative in the North Korea nuclear issue will be with the Americans now, rather than depending on talks of any form.

Now the U.S. is actively exerting pressure on North Korea, forcing the North either to compromise or to collapse. If the pressure is sufficient, it may bring down the North Korean regime. The basic logic goes like this: once the leadership in charge of the nuclear issue in North Korea is removed, then the problem will be solved, like what happened in Iraq 10 years ago.

In addition, American military moves taken in response to the North Korea security challenge also put pressure on China. The missile defense system directed at Northeast Asia, the increased American military presence in the region and the efforts to strengthen military alliance are in no way in China's interest. The U.S. expects China either to reign in North Korea so that a diplomatic solution could be possible or to sanction against North Korea to speed up its collapse.

At this moment, most decision makers in Washington might be feeling very good of the carefully crafted new approach. In Obama's first term, his policy toward North Korea was called "Strategic Patience," and his team might have had the same good feeling too. However, what happened afterward? There was the Cheonan Incident, and there was the Yeonpyeong Shelling. What is more, in the past four years, North Korea conducted satellite launches, with two failures and one success, a third nuclear test, displayed new missiles, tore up all agreements related to denuclearization, and began to restart the once disabled 5MW reactor. "Strategic Patience" is a failed policy, and now the Obama administration is developing a new approach. Will it work this time in the coming four years?

Let us suggest he keeps his finger crossed. Otherwise, he may need to find a mentor, like former President Bill Clinton, to learn how to deal with North Korea successfully.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit: http://www.ccgp-fushun.com/opinion/fanjishe.htm

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