But it is not an exaggeration to say that, over the longer term, China is set to become the third biggest supplier in this market. China has never given up on efforts to build a commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. In 1970, China began the Yun-10 project and carried out an initial test flight in 1980. But Boeing entered the domestic market after economic reforms began in 1978, and the Yun-10 was never a commercial success. Subsequent cooperation with McDonnell Douglas ended in 2000, after the latter was taken over by Boeing. But in 2008, China managed to attract an Airbus A320 assembly line to Tianjin. And in the same year, Comac was established in Shanghai.

Instead of pushing to design and build entirely indigenous aircrafts, China today is taking a more realistic and strategic approach to the commercial aircraft market. China continues to purchase U.S. aviation products and parts, which has resulted in large trade deficit with the US in the sector. The US regards developments such as the C919 with deep concern. But it is best not to jump to the conclusion that this is another "China Threat." Instead we need to examine the strategic implications of China's move into the commercial aircraft sector.

First of all, upgrading the capacity to build large commercial aircraft reflects China's overall economic development. It represents an historic opportunity, but one full of uncertainties. Of the 50 confirmed orders for C919 received at the Zhuhai Airshow, 45 were from domestic airlines. The C919 has to compete with Boeing and Airbus who already have complete industrial chains. And technicians who participated on the Y-10 and MD programs remain skeptical about using foreign technologies. Most of the uncertainty results from a lack of mutual trust between the major players. China will need to become more open to foreign assistance in the aviation sector, because the best way of improving trust is through open minded cooperation.

Secondly, China's intensive investment in aircraft manufacturing is not just about producing aircraft but also about organizing the nation's industrial resources. In the initial stages, major financial support will be directed to provincial aviation industries and institutions across the country, from north to south and from coastal provinces to the interior. In this way, China hopes to scale up its high-end manufacturing capacity and build a nationwide network of production bases for long term development.

Thirdly, buying cutting edge technologies from foreign companies is about more than spending foreign reserves to plug the development gap. Comac will purchase parts from various foreign suppliers while using domestic technology in every possible way. But Comac is obviously not in a rush to develop entirely indigenous aircraft. Foreign technology will help China's research institutions foster innovation in aviation components, materials and digital systems. China could also develop its own supporting products in key technologies by using them in the C919. These are the real value-for-money gains from spending money with foreign partners.

Last but not least, the C919 project is providing new opportunities for the defense industries in several major cities, including Chengdu, Shenyang and Xi'an. Comac regards this cooperation as a win-win strategy. China's civil aircraft market is growing rapidly. Comac can leverage the defense industry's expertise in aircraft manufacturing, while the defense industry can profit from the civilian market. And in technical terms, it is possible that a version of the C919 could be adapted as a military cargo plane.

To sum up, China's commercial aircraft manufacturing industry is not yet a threat to either Boeing or Airbus. Neither is it a threat to US national security, as China still has a long way to go to catch up technically. US industries will benefit significantly from the C919 project, since they have a strong competitive advantage in high-tech manufacturing. But the growing scale of China's manufacturing capabilities will allow it to play a high-end supporting role and give it more flexibility in choosing global partners.

The author is a Vasey Fellow of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)