However, the question still remains, why did Medvedev choose to land now? The first reason has to do with Russia's domestic politics. A presidential election is around the corner, and although it is generally speculated that Vladimir Putin will stage a comeback, the possible challengers to Medvedev are not yet clear. If Medvedev wants another term in office, this landing move will definitely be a plus for him. With regard to the Northern Territories, the whole Russian nation, commoners and elites alike, is strongly opposed to any concession to Japan. Most Russians believe that the occupation of these islands was materialized by the Yalta Agreement as the deserved compensation for Russia's great sacrifice in fighting against Japan during the Second World War. According to a survey by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Surveys (VTsIOM), in 1994, 76 percent Russians were against any concession to Japan on the issue of the South Kuril Islands; in a similar survey conducted in 2009, however, the percentage rose to 89 percent.

From a realistic perspective, Medvedev's landing serves as a warning for Japan to keep its distance from the Northern Territories. Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has always been keenly mindful of its Northern Territories. Over the past 60 years, the Japanese government has never stopped appointing officials to exercise nominal administration over these four islands. In 1983, Japan issued the "Special Measures for Promoting the Resolution of the Issue of Northern Territories," by which the Japanese people could choose to change their household registration to the Northern Territories. From 1992, residents of Hokkaido and the Northern Territories could visit each other without applying for a visa. Up till now, as many as 10,000 Japanese citizens have stepped onto Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan.

From the perspective of China, Medvedev's landing could be viewed as a good-neighbor move. It was no coincidence that, not long after China's row with Japan over the ship collision near the Diaoyu Islands, Medvedev visited China and the two sides pledged to "mutually support each other on issues relating to their respective national sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and other core interests."

It should be noted that behind Japan's territorial disputes with Russia, China and South Korea, there invariably lurks the shadow of the United States. In this sense, Medvedev's landing could also be aimed to try the attitude and response of the U.S.

During the East Asia Summit from October 28 to 30 attended by China, Japan, U.S. and Russia, the Chinese premier did not meet with his Japanese counterpart, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's reiteration that the Treaty of Security and Safeguard between Japan and the United States applies to the Diaoyu Islands was not only tantamount to adding fuel to the already fiery Sino-Japanese relationship but also agitated Russia, who share China's concern. In this analysis, it was only natural that Medvedev acted so quickly. Russia's diplomacy has always been characterized by its quick response and surprise moves, which the United States understands so well. The US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told a news briefing on November 1, "We are quite aware of the dispute. We do back Japan regarding the Northern Territories." However, when asked whether the Treaty of Security and Safeguard between Japan and the United States applies to the Northern Territories, the spokesperson refused to comment.

The fact that State Secretary Clinton made her visit to China immediately after the East Asia Summit and met with China's State Councilor Dai Bingguo is evidence enough that, on one hand, the United States wants to strike a balance without exacerbating conflicts in the territorial disputes among Northeast Asian countries, while on the other hand, it also wants to fish in troubled waters to reap the benefits.

In the struggle for Tokdo Island (Takeshima Island) between Japan and South Korea, we can also find the US presence. Since both Japan and South Korea are US allies, the basic principle of the United States is to pressure Japan in the fashion that the latter will not provoke South Korea. This has been an important reason for the relative appeasement in the island dispute between these two countries.

Therefore, both the dispute between China and Japan and that between Japan and Russia cannot possibly be solved in the near future, nor will it be more arousing or agitating because of individual incidents. Behind brawls of various kinds what really matters is power, which not only takes the form of combat capabilities but also is reflected in the ability to address emergencies, to wield the diplomatic muscle, and to remain patient and perseverant. Medvedev's landing has been a simple, direct and effective way for Russia to claim its sovereignty. And there is surely something in Russia's tactics that informs or inspires China.

(This article was first published in Chinese and  translated by Luo Huaiyu.)