The signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the Chinese mainland has led to two debates in Taiwan - whether or not the enhanced economic integration with the mainland will hurt Taiwan's interest, and whether or not it will facilitate subsequent political integration. Both debates are spurious to the extent that they mainly reflect the pro-independence propensity hidden in their upsurge. But none of these debates can shape either the direct answers to these questions or the influence of pro-independence stance in the future because the ECFA is bound to generate contradictory implications.

The first debate is a familiar one between competition and protection elsewhere too. The argument against the ECFA holds that a more open market will lead to the dumping of goods from the mainland, which are of lower quality but inexpensive. The ruling Kuomintang counters that only an open market can effectively enhance the competitive edge of the goods made in Taiwan in the long run and the mainland market provides the scale of economy for Taiwan producers to achieve just that.

But the real debate is not about protectionism.

The opposition's sheer purpose is to use the dumping argument to consolidate the image of threat from the other side of the Straits. The authorities are well aware of that. That's why the Kuomintang has decided, with Beijing's tacit consent, to restrict as many goods as possible in which mainland producers have the competitive advantage. For example, the cheaper mainland labor is not allowed in Taiwan, mainland agricultural products are excluded from the list of tariff-exempted goods, and the other sectors that the mainland enjoys a competitive advantage are disqualified for compromise.

More importantly, the white-collar professionals whom analysts in Taiwan traditionally consider less prepared for internationalization are specifically banned.

When all these restrictions apply, the Kuomintang's alleged rationale of using the ECFA to enhance Taiwan's competitive capacity is immediately nullified. In other words, the Kuomintang does not really think about competitiveness. Its major concern is how to avoid the impression that Taipei is making concessions to, or rapprochement with, Beijing. Implicitly in its protectionist adjustment is the awareness that the opposition argues what it argues only to harass the Kuomintang by painting it to be a "capitulationist" party.

The second debate on the potential of political integration engineered by the mainland seems real not only to the pro-independence forces in Taiwan, but a good number of international observers. The opposition specifically charges that the ECFA is actually the Kuomintang's political agenda. In fact, the opposition urges a referendum to approve the ECFA, hoping the referendum could politicize the ECFA into a choice between independence and unification. The fact that the vote would be cast only by Taiwan voters should be enough to demonstrate the island's "independence" despite the result of the vote.

It is not clear, though, if the shift toward the economic aspect would succeed or even reflect the true intention of the Kuomintang. First of all, if the Kuomintang did not de-politicize the ECFA issue to its extreme, the ECFA would have had no chance at all from the beginning.

The Kuomintang consistently enlists a materialist discourse to address its cross-Straits policy, which basically treats the mainland disrespectfully as no more than a market or a supplier of resources.

This materialist discourse is intended not only to offset the political implications of the ECFA but also to pre-empt any nationalist arousal that pro-unification advocates might experience and enact.

Ironically, given the expanding scope of interaction across the Straits that the ECFA will surely bring about, the political parties will lose monopoly over what will come out of the ECFA. Political implications can go several ways. The ECFA-led broader and deeper interaction could, for example, render the political settlement a decreasingly relevant issue among the rank and file to the disillusionment of the pro-unification advocates as well as the alienation of the pro-independence forces.

It could, on the contrary, generate an atmosphere wherein political integration is no longer a so sensible issue that resistance to it could lose momentum.

It is politically useful for the opposition in Taiwan to politicize the ECFA issue only in the short run since the Kuomintang strictly adheres to the economic aspect. The Kuomintang's materialist approach is actually a response to the opposition's politicization strategy.

This materialist approach leaves the political implications of the ECFA unanswered. They cannot be answered indeed as the ECFA could result in alienation from politics on the one hand, and less resistance toward unification on the other.

The author is professor of political science, National Taiwan University.