The final blow to Fukuda's grip on power came from New Komeito, the LDP's junior coalition partner.
With its sights set on the Tokyo metropolitan assembly election slated for next summer, New Komeito has been lobbying for an early election. The party balked at Fukuda's plans to enact the key bills by using the ruling camp's two-thirds majority in the Lower House again, saying such high-handed actions would provoke a public backlash.
New Komeito also ensured that the government's fiscal stimulus package to ease the pains of rising prices and pump up the flagging economy included fixed-sum tax cuts, overcoming Fukuda's resistance to the measure. Fukuda feared that the proposed tax cuts would open the door to profligate public spending.
The LDP cannot enact bills disapproved by the opposition-controlled Upper House without cooperation of New Komeito. The LDP cannot hope to win in the next election without the help of Soka Gakkai, a lay Buddhist organization which is New Komeito's support base.
This political reality apparently caused the LDP to put strong pressure on Fukuda to accept New Komeito's demands.
These developments highlighted afresh the Fukuda government's political weakness by making clear that it cannot even define the directions of its fiscal and security policies.
It is not hard to imagine how Fukuda lost his political energy in the face of such pressure from Minshuto, public opinion and New Komeito.
But there was another potential way for Fukuda to untangle the situation. After compiling his first budget, he could have dissolved the Lower House in January for a snap election to secure the legitimacy of his government.
During the three years since the 2005 election, which Koizumi cast as a virtual national referendum on his postal privatization initiative, two prime ministers, Abe and Fukuda, took office.
But neither called a Lower House election to seek a public mandate. The ruling coalition suffered a drubbing in the Upper House poll last summer.
