By Shen Dingli
The US National Intelligence Committee (NIC) concludes in the
2007 assessment of Iran's nuclear program, published earlier this
month, that the US intelligence community is now quite sure Iran
suspended its nuclear arms program in fall 2003 and is very
unlikely to be developing nuclear weapons right now.
The words rocked the world like a nuclear blast. Did the US
intelligence community just prove itself wrong? Has it hogtied
President Bush's Iran policy in the time left before he moves out
of the White House by branding it ill-founded? What were they
thinking?
How should we interpret the assessment anyway? Judging by the
effect alone, this writer's analysis of the assessment report is
this: Its core element should help President Bush out of a bind
while keeping the noose around Iran's and some other countries'
necks, and may contribute to casting Bush's place in history in a
positive light.
First off, the report has confirmed that Iran was developing
nuclear weapons between the 1980s and 2003, and that the secret
program broke the country's promise to the international community
that it would not build such weapons.
In other words, the pressure the international community has put
on Iran over the nuclear issue all these years is justified. The
International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) have not pressured and penalized Iran because they
caught the Gulf nation building nuclear bombs, but because Teheran
had been secretly pursuing a nuclear program and has been reluctant
to come totally clean about it. That's why Iran has been banned
from uranium enrichment.
The US intelligence assessment gives people no reason to assume
the Iran nuclear issue is now resolved, or that it is time to stop
or ease sanctions against the country. On the contrary, as long as
people believe the US intelligence assessment is still worth
something, then its conclusions that Iran was covertly developing
nuclear weapons up until fall 2003 should stand.
Although Iran has suspended its nuclear program, the fact that
it has not been very cooperative in clarifying its past nuclear
work warrants continued sanctions by the international community.
And as long as Teheran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of
relevant UNSC resolutions, some believe the country deserves
further punishments for thumbing its nose at the security council
and for violating the UN Charter.
The bottom line laid out in the NIC report is: Iran did try to
develop nuclear arms. That conclusion should keep Tehran's hands
tied and stiffen the resolve of those countries that already back
sanctions until Iran fully complies with relevant UNSC
resolutions.
It is fair to say the NIC's conclusions are tougher on Iran than
the IAEA's reports are. The latter has yet to say beyond reasonable
doubt that it is sure Iran was developing nuclear weapons or
intended to. All it has said so far is that there is no evidence
Iran is developing nuclear arms or has any plans to do so.
The most recent IAEA report maintains there is no reason to
believe Iran is developing nuclear arms, but the international
watchdog cannot determine the nature of Iran's past secret nuclear
program, and Teheran refuses to comply with an UNSC demand that it
stop uranium enrichment, though the pace at which Iran is
conducting uranium enrichment is not as fast as the rest of the
world previously imagined.
Second, this intelligence assessment may help President Bush out
of a bind. The Bush administration has succeeded in pulling two
resolutions out of the UNSC authorizing sanctions against Iran,
effectively banishing it on ethical and legal grounds.
Since there is basically no evidence that Iran has kept its
nuclear program going since fall 2003, it would not make the US
safer to continue its current Iran policy without a sound
excuse.
Therefore, the NIC assessment helps lay the legal groundwork for
the Bush administration to readjust its Iran policy and stop
threatening Teheran with possible war. Since Iran is not developing
nuclear arms at the moment, it would be a double mistake - in terms
of policy goals and means - to keep pressuring Iran with war
threats.
What the US is likely to do is, first, continue to press for a
thorough investigation into the nature of Iran's past nuclear
program so that the conclusions of its intelligence gathering would
be verified in the eyes of the international community. That would
simultaneously avoid exposing US intelligence agencies' sources and
tarnishing Iran's image.
Another thing the US may do is limit Iran's freedom to develop
nuclear energy for civilian use through long-term, close monitoring
to prevent the country from stepping beyond the requirements of
nuclear energy for civilian use. Once the US is let off the hook of
threatening Iran with military force, Washington would be able to
do more about other global issues.
Also, this assessment could help polish the Bush
administration's record in history. It is widely believed the US
was wrong to have launched the war in Iraq, which Bush probably
knows very well, too.
But this war shocked and awed Libya so much that Tripoli
voluntarily gave up its secret nuclear program. This unexpected
benefit not only contributed to US security, but also struck a blow
for global non-proliferation efforts. Why the Libyan government
abandoned its nuclear ambitions is immaterial, the fact that it did
so will contribute to regional stability and benefit the human
race.
According to the intelligence assessment report, the 2003 war in
Iraq might have scared Iran as well as Libya. The US mounted its
"pre-emptive strike" against Iraq despite the lack of evidence to
prove that Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction and was fiercely
criticized by the international community for doing so.
However, the move might have curtailed Iran's secret efforts to
develop nuclear weapons. It is possible that the pragmatic leaders
of Iran found it necessary to halt the secret arms program after
careful consideration.
The NIC's assessment report could enhance the president's place
in history, allowing the US to be more assertive in international
affairs by freeing Washington's hands in dealing with the Iran
nuclear issue. At the same time, it prevents the UNSC from backing
away from existing resolutions on sanctions against Teheran because
the sanctions have not forced Iran to comply, and Iran could
rekindle its nuclear arms ambition when it feels the time is
right.
The author is a professor and executive dean of the Institute of
International Studies, and director of the Center for American
Studies at Fudan University.
(China Daily December 18, 2007)
