By Feng Zhaokui

 

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's diplomatic policies since taking office have shown three unchanged and three changed aspects from those of his predecessor Shinzo Abe and of the latter's predecessor Junichiro Koizumi.

 

The unchanged aspects are: the principle of diplomacy based on Japan's national interests; the Japan-US ties are the basic axis of Japan's diplomacy, and efforts to strengthen Japan's status and role in the international community.

 

The three changed aspects are in fact modifications to: the practice during Koizumi's administration to use diplomacy as a tool for his political party and politicians to manifest "personal belief" and pan up nationalism; the overly US-oriented diplomacy that was "totally devoted to" and "integrated with" Washington's cause, and Koizumi's decision to downplay relations with other Asian countries.

 

After the Cold War ended the Japan-US alliance aimed at the Soviet Union lost its "common target" for a while. But, as the "only superpower" left in the world, the US felt it must continue using Japan in implementing its global strategy. It was afraid that Japan, if not firmly under US control, might lean toward China and weaken US influence in Asia or even elbow it out.

 

Meanwhile, as a country well-known for its diplomatic tradition to always bond with "the most powerful nation" in the world, Japan was hoping to "piggyback on" the US to reach its goal of becoming a "normal country", so much so it went all out to advance "Japan-US military integration. The marriage of "national interests" of the two countries gave the Japan-US alliance very strong "resilience".

 

The fundamental condition for keeping an alliance is a "common enemy", which gave rise to the question of which country was good enough to substitute the Soviet Union. It was against this backdrop that some people in Japan and the US started chanting the "China threat theory" to make an excuse for keeping joint military efforts against China.

 

The Japanese rightwing even aspired to substitute the "US-Soviet cold war" with a "US-China cold war" in the hope that the rivalry between China and the US would result in both of them being "too hurt to win the war".

 

The reality is, however, China did not have the strategic intent to challenge the hegemonic status of the US. And the China-US cooperation, including on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, was developing closer by the day into a relationship of constructive cooperation.

 

This resulted in the Japan-US ties entering the "best period in history" under the Koizumi administration; the Sino-US relations were approaching maturity and stability as well, whereas the China-Japan relationship was plunged into the "worst period in history" since the normalization of bilateral ties.

 

The resulting triangle featuring Japan-US, China-US and China-Japan ties with huge contrast between any two of them, weird as it looked, was truly a spectacle.

 

Because Koizumi's hawkish China policy seriously damaged Japan-China relations and was met with widespread opposition from the Japanese public, his successor Abe decided to make some amends by visiting China less than two weeks after taking the prime minister's office on an "ice-thawing" mission in September last year.

 

Premier Wen Jiabao's trip to Japan last April further advanced the ice-thawing process and reflected China's clear intention to counter the Japanese rightwing hawkish diplomacy with the policy of emphasizing "peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit", which incidentally revealed the fact that the Japan-US alliance is "very much dependent" on the so-called China threat theory and the Japan-US military alliance, which is clearly aimed at China, is "built on the frozen China-Japan ties".

 

Meanwhile, the significance of China's efforts to "thaw" the frozen China-Japan relations lies in reducing the intensity of the Japan-US alliance against China. However, faced with China's sincere efforts to restore friendly ties with Japan, Abe went the opposite direction by repeatedly peddling the idea of a "Japan-US-India-Australia four-nation alliance", which public opinion saw as "intended to contain China", during his visit to new Delhi and Canberra.

 

It ended up a negative legacy in Abe's diplomatic record before he stepped down.

 

Prime Minister Fukuda has kept most of the members of Abe's cabinet since taking office, leaving people little reason not to ask: How much of Abe's diplomatic legacy will the new cabinet inherit and how much will it change it?

 

Some members of the media have noted recently a prominent calligraphic reminder on the wall of the prime minister's residence had been changed from the word "fear" to "peace". People will be waiting to see if the China-Japan ties will see "peace" replace "fear", as they look forward to waving frigid winds of winter goodbye and welcoming warm breezes of spring with open arms.

 

The author is a researcher with the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

 

(China Daily October 26, 2007)