By Feng Zhaokui
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's diplomatic policies since
taking office have shown three unchanged and three changed aspects
from those of his predecessor Shinzo Abe and of the latter's
predecessor Junichiro Koizumi.
The unchanged aspects are: the principle of diplomacy based on
Japan's national interests; the Japan-US ties are the basic axis of
Japan's diplomacy, and efforts to strengthen Japan's status and
role in the international community.
The three changed aspects are in fact modifications to: the
practice during Koizumi's administration to use diplomacy as a tool
for his political party and politicians to manifest "personal
belief" and pan up nationalism; the overly US-oriented diplomacy
that was "totally devoted to" and "integrated with" Washington's
cause, and Koizumi's decision to downplay relations with other
Asian countries.
After the Cold War ended the Japan-US alliance aimed at the
Soviet Union lost its "common target" for a while. But, as the
"only superpower" left in the world, the US felt it must continue
using Japan in implementing its global strategy. It was afraid that
Japan, if not firmly under US control, might lean toward China and
weaken US influence in Asia or even elbow it out.
Meanwhile, as a country well-known for its diplomatic tradition
to always bond with "the most powerful nation" in the world, Japan
was hoping to "piggyback on" the US to reach its goal of becoming a
"normal country", so much so it went all out to advance "Japan-US
military integration. The marriage of "national interests" of the
two countries gave the Japan-US alliance very strong
"resilience".
The fundamental condition for keeping an alliance is a "common
enemy", which gave rise to the question of which country was good
enough to substitute the Soviet Union. It was against this backdrop
that some people in Japan and the US started chanting the "China
threat theory" to make an excuse for keeping joint military efforts
against China.
The Japanese rightwing even aspired to substitute the "US-Soviet
cold war" with a "US-China cold war" in the hope that the rivalry
between China and the US would result in both of them being "too
hurt to win the war".
The reality is, however, China did not have the strategic intent
to challenge the hegemonic status of the US. And the China-US
cooperation, including on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, was
developing closer by the day into a relationship of constructive
cooperation.
This resulted in the Japan-US ties entering the "best period in
history" under the Koizumi administration; the Sino-US relations
were approaching maturity and stability as well, whereas the
China-Japan relationship was plunged into the "worst period in
history" since the normalization of bilateral ties.
The resulting triangle featuring Japan-US, China-US and
China-Japan ties with huge contrast between any two of them, weird
as it looked, was truly a spectacle.
Because Koizumi's hawkish China policy seriously damaged
Japan-China relations and was met with widespread opposition from
the Japanese public, his successor Abe decided to make some amends
by visiting China less than two weeks after taking the prime
minister's office on an "ice-thawing" mission in September last
year.
Premier Wen Jiabao's trip to Japan last April further advanced
the ice-thawing process and reflected China's clear intention to
counter the Japanese rightwing hawkish diplomacy with the policy of
emphasizing "peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit", which
incidentally revealed the fact that the Japan-US alliance is "very
much dependent" on the so-called China threat theory and the
Japan-US military alliance, which is clearly aimed at China, is
"built on the frozen China-Japan ties".
Meanwhile, the significance of China's efforts to "thaw" the
frozen China-Japan relations lies in reducing the intensity of the
Japan-US alliance against China. However, faced with China's
sincere efforts to restore friendly ties with Japan, Abe went the
opposite direction by repeatedly peddling the idea of a
"Japan-US-India-Australia four-nation alliance", which public
opinion saw as "intended to contain China", during his visit to new
Delhi and Canberra.
It ended up a negative legacy in Abe's diplomatic record before
he stepped down.
Prime Minister Fukuda has kept most of the members of Abe's
cabinet since taking office, leaving people little reason not to
ask: How much of Abe's diplomatic legacy will the new cabinet
inherit and how much will it change it?
Some members of the media have noted recently a prominent
calligraphic reminder on the wall of the prime minister's residence
had been changed from the word "fear" to "peace". People will be
waiting to see if the China-Japan ties will see "peace" replace
"fear", as they look forward to waving frigid winds of winter
goodbye and welcoming warm breezes of spring with open arms.
The author is a researcher with the Institute of Japanese
Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(China Daily October 26, 2007)
