By Fu Mengzi
The United States continues to come up short as it focuses its
diplomatic strength on dealing with three major crises - Iraq, Iran
and the Korean Peninsula. Not just a failure of the Bush
administration, the roots go back to the end of the Cold War. But
the dismal diplomacy may actually be opening up new options for
international cooperation.
At the top of the only superpower's diplomatic concerns: Iraq's
security and day-to-day life continue to deteriorate. Diplomacy
over the Iranian nuclear issue is faring little better, as the new
UN Resolution 1747 has not persuaded President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's government to abandon its nuclear ambitions. And
North Korea denuclearization process is stalled over the details of
the US unfreezing North Korean funds.
Elsewhere things have not gone to America's liking. Its greater
Central Asia plan has not proceeded smoothly. Relations between the
United States and some of the Central Asian nations where the
"color revolution" took place failed to warm up.
In East Asia, the United States is very interested in joining
the vibrant regional cooperation. But its outdated East Asia policy
of military presence and allies first is holding back the US from
wholeheartedly participation.
Leftist sentiment in Latin America is growing, led by Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez with his hardboiled anti-Americanism. At the
same time, the construction of the Americas Free Trade Zone is a
non-starter.
The United States was once the most enthusiastic of all
globalization advocates, seeing it as synonymous with
Americanization. But the US is finding its financial, exchange rate
and trade policies far less influential than they once were as
globalization is back on the track of natural development.
The United States still expects a lot from the Doha world trade
negotiations but does not have the courage to play the role of
coordinator. The US remains the world's only superpower with
unrivaled strength and influence, all the more reason to question
the defects in its strategies and inadequacy of its national
strength.
The failures have not been the result of US unilateralism or
pre-emptive strike policy.
?
From a broad viewpoint over a long period of time, the United
States has been in some sort of strategic retreat. It did not
happen after 9/11, but rather at the end of the Cold War.
At that time the US knew it faced multiple challenges. But, as
described in Thomas Barnett's The Pentagon's New Map, it could not
find a "near peer competitor" in the eyes of Washington
strategists. As a result, there was not enough to keep the giant
military machine busy.
The 9/11 terror attack temporarily interrupted the US search for
a "near peer competitor" and forced it to give strategic priority
to fighting terrorism. At the same time, the growing
interdependency among nations also hindered US workings to create a
major strategic rival for itself. An example of the new
interdependency is China's US$2 billion assistance to Southeast
Asian nations ravaged by the 1997 financial crisis.
Clearly the strategic retreat was not voluntary on Washington's
part or a result of other major powers' rise while the United
States was preoccupied fighting terrorism. The strategic retreat
was not something the US wanted. This is evidenced by the
superpower's continuing to nose around everywhere, whether it was
needed or not.
The retreat had a lot to do with the changes the world undertook
after the Cold War and especially following 9/11. The frustrations
suffered by US anti-terror strategy further disoriented its
strategic thinking but did not alter the overall backdrop of the
changing times.
The US strategic retreat can be seen in the following
developments.
First, the United States long ago ended heavy involvement in
so-called fringe developments in the world.
Take Africa as an example. After pulling its 30,000-strong
military forces from Somalia without achieving its goal in 1994 up
to President Bill Clinton's visit to the continent in 1998, the
United States changed its Africa strategy from political to
economic activities and from giving aid to emphasizing trade. The
Bush administration has since concentrated on stamping out
terrorism, pumping oil and fighting disease.
The main focus of the African Command Washington established in
2006 is probably still anti-terrorism, but its effectiveness
remains to be seen.
In Latin America, former President Jimmy Carter's democratic
push has been lauded as a historic achievement. Throughout the 12
years spanning the terms of President Carter and his successor,
Ronald Reagan, most Latin American countries were converted to
democracy and some saw their economies improve.
It was a time when the Washington consensus was all the rage.
Come the 1990s, however, President Clinton was asking: "Where are
we? Where is Latin America?"
In 1994, Washington called for free trade among American
countries, but neo-liberalism failed to thrive in Latin America.
The ensuing 10 years turned into a wasted decade as the wealth gap
widened, unemployment soared, inflation worsened and social
conflicts accelerated, leading to the collapse of the American
Summit in 2005.
During the globalization drive, US manufacturing's contribution
to the nation's GDP dwindled to just 12 percent. This upset its
trade format with Latin America of raw material imports and
finished product exports.
The growth point of US investment and trade also shifted to
other growing markets in the world. For instance, by 2005 US
businesses had invested US$66 billion in China compared with US$44
billion in Latin America.
The US entered the Central Asia political black hole after 9/11.
Washington aimed to reap a strategic windfall with Afghanistan as a
critical bridge linking Central Asia and South Asia. But the
strategy was blocked by instability in Afghanistan caused by the
beaten but not dead Taliban forces hellbent on regaining
control.
Second, the United States has lost much of its influence in key
strategic areas of the world. In Europe, the US shifted its
attention soon after the war in Kosovo. Washington lost interest in
searching for a heavy-weight rival in Europe as NATO expanded
eastward with little difficulty.
The political split among major powers over the war in Iraq hurt
not only Europe but the United States. The fact that Washington let
Russia off the hook, forgave Germany and attempted to punish France
does not mean the US can do whatever it wants with these three
countries. Clearly, the United States' letting Russia off the hook
did not improve their bilateral relations.
In Asia, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and the
warming up of US-India military ties with increased cooperation on
nuclear technology remained jarring notes in the tune of regional
peace and development. It gave rise to the desire for self-defense
among some lesser nations.
Third, the US did not take advantage of the war on terror to
establish an effective rule of security in the post-Cold War era.
The country finds itself clueless over quite a few issues. Small
wonder some Americans miss the Cold War.
By adopting unilateralism, taking a frequently self-centered
approach to world issues and readily dispensing double-standard
judgments, the US has sent out numerous confusing signals to the
rest of the world.
Consequently, despite the big stick it wields, the US has not
been able to scare off the small and weak countries which are
defying Washington by either developing nuclear programs or taking
anti-US stands.
Look no further than North Korea and Iran for examples of
minnows going nuclear. And Venezuela has gone so far as to seek to
form an anti-US alliance with Iran.
Fourth, the wholesale spread of democracy everywhere has proved
counterproductive to the United States as the US brand has lost its
appeal in many parts of the world.
Though unable to prove the lasting correctness of democracy and
peace, the Bush administration still believes democracy can lead to
relative security and pave the way for the ultimate removal of all
hotbeds of terrorism.
The popularly-elected Palestinian Hamas and Iranian Ahmadinejad
governments have presented a political reality Washington would
rather not see, while the Iraqi government brought up by the United
States is increasingly critical of Washington.
Last, America's capability to lead worldwide progress is waning
despite its belief otherwise. The US is still on top of the world
in science and technology, as shown in its scientists' bagging all
Nobel prizes in 2006.
The US finds itself in the sky-high tower of sci-tech supremacy
it has built for itself. It has shut out the rest of the world with
all kinds of barriers, which increase the technological divide. The
result will be to perpetuate disputes over fair and free trade with
other countries.
The US may be forced to live in technological isolation,
unwillingly losing the power it once had to move globalization
forward.
History has the tendency to repeat itself, but that doesn't mean
it always will. No new rising major power wants to become the
frontline of confrontation with the United States, seeing the
history of the Cold War repeat itself.
Cooperation between great powers should be made an important
premise for building a harmonious world. Strategic adjustment based
on such consensus could very well mean that the US strategic
retreat is in fact the start of some fresh expansion.
The author is assistant president of China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations.
(China Daily April 4, 2007)
