By Li Guofu
The Gulf is overcast with the dark clouds of war, with the
international community seriously concerned about the likelihood of
a US attack on Iran.
US President George W. Bush increased the administration's show
of force early this year, ordering another aircraft carrier battle
group and more Patriot missile defense batteries to be deployed to
the Gulf to prevent Iran from dominating the Middle East.
At the same time, US forces in Iraq raided the Iranian consulate
in Baghdad, resulting in the arrest of several Iranian diplomatic
personnel. The US government claimed it had obtained substantial
evidence that Iran had supplied weapons to Islamic insurgents in
Iraq.
The United States is determined to strike at terrorists and
armed insurgents entering Iraq from Iran and Syria and cut off
their supply routes. Last month, Vice-President Dick Cheney went so
far as to state that "all options are on the table" if Iran
continues to defy UN-led efforts to end its nuclear ambitions. "All
options" being understood as including a military attack on Iranian
nuclear facilities.
Iran, meanwhile, has shown no fear in the face of mounting US
saber rattling. It has held large-scale military exercises in the
Gulf and tested new missiles, while warning Washington it would
hurt American interests worldwide if attacked by the US first. Iran
has also sped up its research and development of nuclear
technology.
This fang-baring face-off between Iran and the US is pushing
their already tense relations to a breaking point. On January 14,
the Kuwaiti press claimed the US would launch a military strike
against Iran's nuclear facilities before April, while US mainstream
media reported that the Pentagon had allegedly worked out an action
plan for attacks on Iran.
It is safe to say that Bush's newly adjusted policy is tougher
and more aggressive than before and therefore more threatening. It
is fair to say the growing tension between the US and Iran has
increased the likelihood of a US strike on Iran, but the outcome
will most likely be just a scare.
The aim of Bush's Iran policy at the moment is to bring about
change by increasing pressure on Teheran. By keeping "all options
on the table", especially the use of military force, the US intends
to maintain maximum pressure on Iran to change its stand on the
nuclear issue.
As international pressure has begun to have positive effects on
Iran, a rash military action against Iran would most likely result
in helping the Iran hawks gain popularity.
The US is now exerting more pressure on Iran from several
directions, including the military threat; political pressure,
mainly in joint actions with the European Union to push for
increased UN Security Council sanctions against Iran; financial
measures to cut off Iran's monetary connection with the outside
world; and the formation of a regional alliance against Teheran in
a bid to further isolate the Islamic Republic in the Gulf
region.
It should be pointed out that the US is not just using a big
stick on Iran but luring it with carrots as well. US Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice said clearly not long ago that she was ready
to hold talks with Iranian officials anywhere if Teheran agreed to
suspend uranium enrichment.
Washington then expressed willingness to participate in the
upcoming international conference on ways to stabilize the Iraqi
situation without barring Iran.
Though Iran has repeatedly dismissed US pressure as
psychological warfare, the country is in fact taking the threat
seriously, as shown in its frequent military exercises and
preparation for war.
Dealing with the growing demand by the international community
to halt its uranium enrichment operations, Iran has also been
playing two hands.
While refusing to compromise on the uranium enrichment issue,
Teheran has expressed the hope of resuming negotiations. It keeps
emphasizing that both sides can discuss anything, including a
temporary suspension of uranium enrichment. At the same time,
Teheran claims it would never accept the precondition of "ending
enrichment before talks".
Meanwhile, Iran continues to cooperate with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and allows the IAEA to inspect its
nuclear facilities. It has also refrained from a radical response
to some of the more provocative maneuvers by the US so as not to
give Washington any excuse to fire the first shot.
There is little doubt Iran was surprised by the swift and
unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1737, imposing
sanctions on Iran at the end of last year. The resolution put the
Islamic Republic on the defensive internationally.
As a result, several political heavyweights, including National
Interest Assurance Committee Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani and former
President Mohammad Khatami, publicly criticized the Ahmadinejad
government's foreign policies and its handling of the nuclear issue
in a show of high-level dissent rarely seen in Iran.
According to the country's constitution, the Supreme Leader of
Iran is Grand Ayatollah Ali Khomenei, not President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
Therefore, under the threat of US military buildup in the Gulf
and unfavorable international opinion, it is possible that Iran
will change its stand on the uranium enrichment issue at a critical
moment.
This kind of policy shift has happened before. For instance,
Iran resisted heavy pressure from the European Union only to
compromise at the last minute some years back, leading to the
signing of the Paris Agreement and Teheran Agreement.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Iran nuclear issue
concerns the US as well as Iran's key strategic interests. Even if
Teheran's stand on nuclear development changes, it would only
achieve a temporary relaxation of tension between the two sides. It
would hardly bring about a fundamental change in Iran's stand on
nuclear development nor substantial change in Washington's Iran
policy.
To a certain extent, the Iran nuclear issue is in essence the
sum of all fears in US-Iran relations. The tension between the two
countries over the nuclear issue will persist until bilateral ties
are substantially improved. That also means it is impossible to
completely rule out the possibility of escalating conflicts,
unexpected flare-ups or relapses following improvement.
The author is a researcher with the China International
Studies Institute.
(China Daily March 8, 2007)
