After a month's delay, the 10+1 summit between the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China will be held over the
weekend in Cebu, in the Philippines. As before, the United States
will watch with some nervousness.
From a geopolitical angle, China's importance to Southeast Asia
should have been greater than any other power inside or outside
Asia. But for much of the time since World War II (WWII), China's
role was either ignored or constantly questioned and blocked due to
international and domestic circumstances.
Around the time of the Bandong Conference in 1955, the
relationship between China and Southeast Asia appeared to enjoy a
brief warming period, but it was soon overwhelmed by mutual
suspicions in the Cold-War climate.
ASEAN was originally formed in 1967 not to work for regional
economic cooperation as it is today but to guard against and
counter China. The two sides were not able to improve ties until
the early 1990s. The experience of the past 40 years can be summed
up in two realities.
One is that most ASEAN members are smaller countries, whose
survival often depends on the outside world. This means that their
China policies and strategies can be easily swayed by global
political and economic currents.
Most Southeast Asian nations have relied on the United States
and Japan economically since WWII and China was initially ASEAN's
perceived adversary. This and the fact that China was politically
at odds with the West at that time compelled Southeast Asian
nations to stand opposite China.
Later on, though, these countries started looking for the point
of strategic balance between China and the West as relations
improved.
The second fact is that Southeast Asian countries, especially
the founding members of ASEAN, have put their foreign policies at
the mercy of utilitarianism and realist principles. While
ideological differences were undeniably a negative factor in the
past, current and potential interests can render such differences
insignificant.
Southeast Asian nations were still doubtful when China's economy
began to surge, but they tweaked their foreign and economic
strategies as soon as they saw clearly what China's modernization
drive had to offer.
For instance, during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China
went all out to help these countries recover, which in turn led to
the gradual strategic shift of their policies towards China.
For its part, China has made some commendable policy adjustments
in the past 10 years. Two aspects deserve emphasis.
The first is reflected in the tremendous efforts, including some
major compromises, China has made to win the trust of ASEAN
members. The 10+1 format constitutes a pragmatic and effective
process for conducting useful dialogue. It eventually resulted in
the historic progress of China's joining the ASEAN non-aggression
treaty although it is not a member of the association.
China's willingness to put aside territorial disputes over the
Nansha Islands (the Spratleys) also helped relieve diplomatic
friction caused by the "China threat" clamor.
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The second aspect lies in China's foresighted proposal to set a
definite goal to anchor its relations with ASEAN on a long-term
basis to create a 10+1 free trade zone by the year 2010. This has
led to a clear turning point in ASEAN's China policy.
For the past five years or so, China's exchanges with ASEAN have
largely centered on this pivotal goal. The pursuit of a common
market has not only convinced both sides to deal with each other in
more depth but has helped their ties weather various
distractions.
Currently, China and ASEAN are closer than at any other time in
recent history. The 10+1 commemorative summit held in Nanning,
capital of South China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, late last
year serves as a clear proof.
However, both sides need to understand each other better. Their
mutual trust has to be deepened.
When I was invited to share my analysis of China-ASEAN relations
on Phoenix TV's current affairs talk show, the discussion stirred
some interest among scholars. So I would like to make a few points
clearer.
First, China must commit more efforts and resources to its
relations with Southeast Asian nations while seeking a more active
role in regional and world affairs. It is particularly important
for China to secure stability on its own doorstep or its efforts on
the larger world stage will be distracted by uncertainties in its
own backyard.
From a geographical, historical, economic and cultural point of
view, China is capable of making Southeast Asia a key area that
will further enhance its status as a global player. China should
not undertake hegemonic strategies towards its southern neighbors
as the United States did with the Monroe Doctrine.
With ASEAN as a focus in its broad global vision, China will
play a bigger and more constructive role in all regional affairs.
From academics to the general public, China's understanding of
Southeast Asia is not yet in sync with the reorientation of the
country's development strategy.
Most people in the country still seem to be fixated on Europe
and North America. As a matter of fact, Southeast Asia is an
indispensable partner for China on its way to a larger global
stage.
Then there is America. While China and the United States find
more of their national interests overlapping these days, the
potential conflict of interest between the two looms everywhere,
particularly in Southeast Asia. The best thing for China to do is
to prevent this region from becoming an arena of contention and
rivalry between the big powers.
Du Ping is a senior writer with Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao
newspaper.
(China Daily January 11, 2007)
