The curtain went down December 22 on the latest round of the
six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, which
resumed after a 13-month recess.
In the intervening months, so many things had happened -- the US
imposed financial sanctions on North Korea, North Korea test-fired
missiles and carried out a nuclear test.
Looking back at the latest talks, one can draw the conclusion
that there is still hope to settle the nuclear crisis, but it will
be extremely difficult to achieve this goal.
The talks ended without making any breakthroughs and the stances
of the two primary players on the issue -- the US and North Korea
-- remain tough. This signifies that the road ahead is full of
bumps.
At the closing ceremony, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei
read out the chairman's statement, saying that all parties involved
had reiterated their common goal to make the Korean Peninsula
denuclearized through dialogue and peaceful means and made clear
they would fulfill the pledges they made in a joint communiqué on
September 19, 2005, when the fourth round of six-party talks
concluded.
The fact that the six-party negotiations reopened, with all
parties involved still sticking to their previously made promises,
is itself an accomplishment, taking into account that things have
got all the more complicated during the 13-month recess. This is
why people still have confidence in resolving the Korean Peninsula
nuclear issue.
The chairman's statement also stated that all parties involved
agreed to implement the September 19 joint communiqué phase by
phase, based on the principle of "action to action."
Although this process of fulfilling the commitments in the joint
communiqué by way of "action-to-action" would be extremely
difficult, Christopher Hill, head of the US delegation, indicated
that the six-party talks are still the best way to resolve the
Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.
Kim Kye-gwan, chief North Korean negotiator, appreciated very
much the Herculean efforts made by China to get the talks
restarted. South Korea also expressed its gratitude to China.
Just two days after the September 19 joint communiqué was
released, the US Treasury Department raised the financial question
connected to North Korea and Macao-based Banco Delta Asia froze
North Korea's account.
Though a mere US$24 million was subject to the monetary
sanction, North Korea suffered a great deal given its limited
financial windows to the outside world. Much of its international
aid came via this channel and many of its monetary deals and
transactions are conducted through this outlet.
Things, however, did not stop here. The US raised the monetary
matter shortly after the September 19 joint communiqué was issued.
In the eyes of North Korea, therefore, this was a clear signal of
hostility against it.
North Korea has since insisted that it would not return to the
negotiation table under the pressure of US monetary sanctions and
maintained that removal of the financial sanctions constituted a
precondition for North Korea to go back to the six-party
negotiations.
Chief negotiators of the six parties happened to be present at
an East Asian security conference in Tokyo in the spring of this
year. Kim Kye-gwan told Christopher Hill that he would return to
the talks once Hill gave him the US$24 million. Hill, however,
answered that monetary matters were beyond the remit of the US
State Department and the matter was up to the US Treasury. The
latter, however, responded that this was not a monetary sanction
but law enforcement.
The exchanges show clearly that North Korea links financial
sanctions to the six-party talks but the US is trying to remove the
sanctions from the negotiations.
The latest round of six-party negotiations was restarted because
both North Korea and the US had made some concessions, showing a
certain degree of flexibility. But Washington refused to discuss
the financial sanctions in the six-party sessions, agreeing to US
experts discussing the matter with North Korean representatives
beyond the six-party negotiations. North Korea did not insist that
removal of the sanctions be a precondition for it to return to the
negotiations.
Following the talks, US and North Korean financial experts held
two days of discussions on the monetary sanctions, one day at the
US embassy in Beijing and the other day at the North Korean
embassy. Though the talks ended without outcome, both parties
agreed to continue the financial-sanction talks in New York in
January next year.
Kim Kye-gwan told reporters at the conclusion of the latest
round of talks that he could do nothing because the higher
authorities in Pyongyang insisted that the central subject of the
six-party talks not be discussed before the question of financial
sanctions is settled.
Hill, however, accused North Korea of placing importance on
minor issues, referring to the financial sanctions. But from the
North Korean perspective, removal of the monetary sanctions would
constitute a key turnaround from Washington in its hostility toward
North Korea.
In the opinion of this author, North Korea will continue to
stick to this position.
During the latest round of talks, the US delegation put forward
a four-step plan of freezing, reporting, inspection and
denuclearization.
In the first phase, North Korea is supposed to freeze its
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. In return, it expects a written
commitment from the US that it will not attack North Korea.
In the second and third phases, North Korea should report its
nuclear arsenal and facilities to the six-party talks and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Then, IAEA teams will be
sent to North Korea for inspection. In return, the US will provide
North Korea with food and economic aid.
In the fourth phase, North Korea is supposed to eventually give
up its nuclear-weapons bidding and agree to be subjected to
permanent IAEA monitoring. For this, the US will provide more
economic aid.
North Korea reporting its nuclear program to the IAEA is what
Washington cares most about. This is because freezing nuclear
facilities is easy and, in fact, North Korea used to freeze its
nuclear reactors in the past. But the problem is it can restart its
nuclear facilities at any time.
"Reporting," however, is likely to be followed by inspection. In
this sense, reporting its nuclear arsenal and facilities to the
IAEA indicates that North Korea has made up its mind to give up its
nuclear program altogether. This is the most difficult step to be
taken.
(The author is a researcher with the Institute of American
Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)
(China Daily December 26, 2006)
