Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian's recent termination of the
"national unification council" and doing away with its guidelines
left relevant US government departments, Congress and think tanks
disgusted and disappointed.
They are now also more vigilant against Chen's "rushed
independence" attempts than before.
Against this backdrop, the United States welcomed Kuomintang
(KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou with uncharacteristic pomp, which
showed more of Washington's dislike for Chen than its fondness for
Ma.
While in the United States, Ma managed to dispel Washington's
suspicion about his intention by clearly stating KMT's adherence to
the one-China principle and the "1992 consensus," as well as
demanding that the Chinese mainland embrace "democracy" as soon as
possible.
Following these developments, a cross-Straits economic and trade
forum was held in Beijing, and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao met with Ma's predecessor Lien
Chan.
The series of high-level interactions indicates that the Chinese
mainland, the United States and the pan-blue camp (who represent
majority will in Taiwan) have reached a tacit agreement to oppose
attempts for Taiwan's "constitutional independence."
As conventional wisdom goes, Chen should know very well he does
not stand a chance of succeeding against such powerful opponents.
But why is he still headed in the direction of "Taiwan
independence" against better judgment?
By playing the termination of unification council and guidelines
card, to be followed by that of "constitutional reform," Chen is
acting like a gambler desperately hoping to win his last bet.
The bid is to draw media and international attention and
solidify his "deep green" voter base for regaining the center spot
in local politics. But after two weeks of pondering, there should
be no doubt he has some hidden agenda to accomplish with that
calculated move.
Chen has found and is trying to take advantage of the rifts in
the co-operative bond between the Chinese mainland, the United
States and the pan-blue camp in Taiwan.
First, let's take a look at the basic standings of the three
parties. The United States has always followed the principle of
"hedging." Its dislike for Chen does not necessarily extend to his
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and even if Washington is happy
to see KMT back in driver's seat in 2008, it will continue to
support DPP as an effective counterbalance to KMT and even the
Chinese mainland.
This means that the United States is not embracing KMT with open
arms. Neither is it siding with the Chinese mainland
wholeheartedly. Its demand for the Chinese mainland to adopt
"democracy" is proof enough.
From the standpoint of opposing "Taiwan independence," KMT is
doing it only as a strategic move, and sometimes has been pressured
to cut DPP some slack.
On his part, Chen is bound, in his constitutional reform drive
over the next few years, to use such claims as "Taiwan is not part
of the People's Republic of China" and "the Republic of China's
sovereignty covers only the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and
Mazu, its population is 23 million and its territory is 36,000
square kilometers," which KMT cannot but agree with tacitly.
That will help widen the rift between KMT and Communist Party of
China (CPC) over their joint opposition against "Taiwan
independence."
The termination of the "national unification council" and
guidelines is an experiment or test balloon by Chen to find out
where and how big the "rifts" are. This attempt did not fail
entirely, as shown in the not-so-enthusiastic public response to
Ma's "ultimate reunification" goal for Taiwan and later an
advertisement acknowledging, "Taiwan independence is the choice of
some Taiwan residents" under deep-green pressure.
It also succeeded to a certain degree in learning where the
United States draws the line on this issue. The world now knows
Washington is prepared to go easy on Chen if necessary.
At his televised meeting with Ma, Chen announced a set of new
"four don'ts and one have not" to replace the old one. By this, he
let the world know he has no intention of honoring the "seven-point
promise" he made to the US administration earlier. In other words,
even the pressure the United States exerts on Chen cannot slow him
down in his rush to "constitutional independence," let alone
forcing him to abandon it.
It should be pointed out that US opposition against "Taiwan
independence" is not without a measure of sincerity, which the
Chinese side acknowledges and is willing to trust for the moment.
However, the present China-US co-operation in opposing "Taiwan
independence" is just a tacit agreement. China's opposition to
"Taiwan independence" is part of its national strategy, while the
United States treats it only as a stop-gap measure taken in a
passive, crisis-management and controlling manner.
This kind of passive crisis management and control means that,
when the Taiwan authorities initiate a provocative move, the United
States will respond in a manner it deems appropriate to the
seriousness of the Chinese mainland's response.
This kind of passive crisis management and control is usually
applied when an emergency has happened, while the Taiwan side has
adopted the tactic of "two steps forward, one step back" to achieve
its goal.
And it has succeeded so far because the US side always responds
by first opposing the two steps forward and then accepting the
substantial one step forward after the Taiwan side takes one step
back.
This practice, in effect, encourages "Taiwan independence"
forces to slowly encroach on the bottom line of the Chinese
mainland.
Since the United States has qualified China as a "stakeholder"
and asked China to be a "responsible member of the international
community," it should also honor the promise it has made to China
that it does not support "Taiwan independence."
With this kind of passive crisis-management and control
mechanism, the United States only uses it when a major step is or
will be taken towards "Taiwan independence," while paying little
attention to the independence philosophy and sending the wrong
signal to "Taiwan independence" advocates by offering sympathy and
support to some extend.
The United States has drawn the line for military intervention
by "unilaterally changing the status quo in the Taiwan Straits,"
meaning it will not initiate a military confrontation with the
Chinese mainland as long as the other side does not "change the
status quo" by use of force.
But the reality is the Chinese mainland is currently fighting
against "Taiwan independence" instead of pushing for reunification,
whereas the Taiwan authorities have gone all out to change the
status quo by attempting speedy independence.
So far, the United States has not officially stated or
explicitly declared it would not help Taiwan defend itself if the
"Taiwan independence" camp unilaterally changes the status quo.
What is more detrimental to the improvement of Sino-US relations
is the fact that the United States is intensifying military
co-operation with Taiwan, which not only encourages "Taiwan
independence" efforts, but also leaves the impression that its
"opposition to unilaterally changing the status quo" is only
applicable to the Chinese mainland.
There is the need for the United States to upgrade its strategy
related to "Taiwan independence" from the current passive
crisis-management and control method to strategic prevention and
blocking. This means the United States should oppose not only
"Taiwan independence" as the "ultimate conclusion," but also any
attempt to push Taiwan towards "independence."
The author is a professor with Renmin University of
China.
(China Daily May 12, 2006)
