By Zhang Tuosheng
Since 2001, significant changes have taken place in the security
relations between China and the United States, with a noticeable
increase of positive factors and continuous strengthening of
co-operation. The two countries have made important headway in
building up strategic mutual trust.
There are two main reasons that have led to the major changes in
Sino-US security relations: The United States has made significant
adjustments to its assessment of security threats, and the basis
for China-US co-operation on security has expanded
considerably.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, the United States' suspicion about and guardedness against
China was on the rise. However, the September 11 attacks jolted the
United States into realizing that the main security threat was not
from China, but from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, especially from the combination of the two.
In the past four years, while busily fighting terrorism and
preventing weapons proliferation, the United States has noticeably
lessened its security pressure on China.
The September 11 incident also provided a new opportunity for
China and the United States to co-operate on counter-terrorism and
anti-proliferation. The two countries have seen their co-operation
grow in recent years in the diplomatic, legal, financial and
intelligence exchange aspects of counter-terrorism, while that in
preventing proliferation has also advanced markedly.
At the same time, Sino-US co-operation in such areas as
maintaining regional peace, alleviating regional confrontations and
many other non-traditional security concerns has been growing in
strength as well as scope. This includes fighting trans-national
crime, fostering energy resources security, checking illegal
immigration, preventing and treating continent-hopping epidemics
and building defences against natural disasters.
Today, as globalization proceeds rapidly, threats posed by
regional conflicts and non-traditional security challenges have
become a common and growing concern in the world. To solve these
problems, China and the United States have no other choice but to
co-operate. Because the co-operation in low-political and
non-traditional security is less susceptible to ideological and
geo-political interference, its development is of great
significance for nurturing mutual trust between the two
countries.
As the basis of their security co-operation expands, China and
the United States have also stepped up co-operation in maintaining
the status quo across the Taiwan Straits in the last two years.
This co-operation is of profound and far-reaching significance.
The Chinese mainland is sparing no efforts to maintain the
Taiwan Straits status quo because it believes time is on its side,
and, if the current basic mindset that both sides of the Taiwan
Straits are parts of one China and the one-China principle enjoys
international support, it is only a matter of time before the
nation achieves the grand goal of peaceful reunification through
unrelenting hard work.
Meanwhile, Washington hopes the status quo of the Taiwan Straits
will stay undisturbed because it is too busy fighting terrorism to
allow itself to be distracted by the emergence of tension in the
Taiwan Straits, and it is even less willing to be dragged into a
military duel with Beijing. Under the present conditions, there has
emerged within the United States a suggestion, different from
"strategic ambiguity" or "strategic clarity," for US-China
"co-management" of the Taiwan Straits situation, indicating the
United States is strengthening "management and control" over
"Taiwan independence."
Another encouraging development is the full resumption of
China-US military contacts following US Defence Secretary
Rumsfeld's visit to China last year. The military contacts were
suspended as a result of the South China Sea mid-air collision in
2001. Although this development still lags behind other aspects of
Sino-US relations, there is hope that the ties between both armed
forces will make greater headway through joint efforts, facilitated
by a willingness from both sides to actively expand their
relations.
Also worth mentioning is the gratifying effectiveness of the
mechanism for bilateral dialogue that has enabled continuous
improvement of Sino-US security relations. From frequent meetings
of both heads of state to the initiation of strategic dialogue in
2005, and to a multitude of forms of bilateral and "first track"
(official) and "second track" (dialogue conducted by scholars as
well as officials in unofficial capacities through
government-sanctioned channels) dialogue, the depth and scope of
China-US dialogue has been growing non-stop, providing an important
guarantee for the sustained development of bilateral security
ties.
That said, however, there is clearly no denying that negative
factors still exist in the way Sino-US security relations develop,
with plenty of uncertainties looming over the horizon.
First up is the fact that there are still some differences
between China and the United States over the latter's policies on
counter-terrorism and proliferation, with those particularly
prominent in China's criticism of US insistence on unilateralism,
pre-emptive strikes and double standards. How these differences
evolve will have a considerable bearing on the development of
bilateral security relations.
The US policies in this respect have shown a positive sign of
swinging back to multilateralism in the last two years, but it is
hard to predict whether the trend will stay. The direction in which
US policy on the Iran nuclear issue is headed is one such important
weathervane.
Next is the serious difference between China and the United
States over the issue of Taiwan. The United States has shown no
sign of letting its "Taiwan Relations Act" go, and insists on
selling weapons to, and upgrading military ties with, Taiwan, while
some powerful forces within the country even dwell on the notion of
keeping the Taiwan Straits in the state of "neither reunification
nor independence" forever.
The shadow of military confrontation in the Taiwan Straits
between China and the United States will be extremely hard to lift
if this situation remains, forcing the armed forces of both
countries to be on guard against each other. In the next two or
three years, China-US security relations are likely to encounter
new challenges as Taiwan secessionists will use the so-called
"constitutional reform" to make more troubles.
Then there is the more profound question of China's development.
As things are, the United States is still overly wary of China's
future development and is concerned that China will challenge its
leadership over security affairs in East Asia, or even challenge
its military dominance in the world someday.
In its Quadrennial Defence Review published recently, the US
Department of Defence has clearly put China at the head of
countries "at the strategic crossroad." In the past two years, the
United States has beefed up its military presence in the
Asia-Pacific region, upgraded its military alliance with Japan,
pushed harder for US-Japan-Australia military co-operation and
US-Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) military co-operation, and, while
continuing to maintain a huge nuclear as well as conventional
arsenal in the region, repeatedly demanded that China increase its
military transparency. Though not entirely aimed at China, these
measures were invariably taken with China in mind.
All in all, undeniable as the progress was that China and the
United States achieved in their bilateral security relations over
the past years, they still have a long way to go before they gain
strategic mutual trust. It remains a long-term task for both
countries to expand co-operation, reduce differences and clear away
misunderstanding.
The author is director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies,
China Foundation For International and Strategic Studies.
(China Daily April 20, 2006)
