The economic relationship between the
United States and China could well be the world's most
important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. And it's not
going well. The stresses and strains of globalization have added
considerable tension to the interplay.
The risks of trade frictions and protectionist actions are
mounting. Perhaps more importantly, a corrosive sense of mistrust
is building between the United States and China that if left
unattended could result in both nations, to say nothing of the
broader global economy, squandering enormous opportunities in the
years ahead. It's time for a wake-up call before it's too late.
The United States is flirting with protectionism at a time when
its need for foreign capital has never been greater. At work is a
highly combustible mixture of macro and politics. America's saving
shortfall has led to a massive trade deficit, and China happens to
account for the biggest portion of that deficit. Meanwhile, a
growing sense of angst has gripped the middle-class American
workers. This has triggered a classic political blame game, with
China being increasingly singled out as the scapegoat. The drumbeat
of China bashing is growing louder and louder.
There is a very simple and extremely powerful macro point that
is being overlooked in this debate: America no longer has the
internal wherewithal to fund the rapid growth of its economy.
Suffering from the greatest domestic saving shortfall in modern
history, the United States is increasingly dependent on surplus
foreign saving to fill the void.
The net national saving rate the combined saving of individuals,
businesses, and the government sector after adjusting for
depreciation fell into negative territory to the tune of -1.2
percent of national income in late 2005. That means America doesn't
save enough even to cover the replacement of its worn-out capital
stock. This is a first for the United States in the modern
post-World War II era, and I believe a first for any great power
over a much longer sweep of world history.
Faced with a shortfall of domestic saving, countries basically
have two choices to curtail economic growth or borrow from the rest
of the world. The first option just doesn't cut it in the land of
abundance.
America, in general, and its consumers, in particular, treat
rapid economic growth as an entitlement. That leaves the United
States with little choice other than to pursue the second option -
drawing heavily on the global saving pool in order to fund economic
growth. Once the United States started down the slippery path of
consuming beyond its internal means, it got harder and harder to
break the habit. Ironically, it has become exceedingly difficult
for Washington to accept the consequences of that habit - a nation
that has become beholden both to external funding and production.
And yet that's exactly how China fits into America's macro
equation.
That underscores a key attribute of the savings-short, deficit
nation: It is forced to run current account deficits in order to
attract the requisite foreign capital. And in the case of the
United States, where external funding needs are so massive - now
closing in on US$800 billion per year, or about US$3 billion per
business day - most of the current account imbalance shows up in
the form of a huge trade deficit. In 2005, the trade deficit in
goods and services accounted for fully 93 percent of the total
current-account gap.
With that external funding imperative come key geopolitical
tradeoffs. Thanks to China, America actually got a rather
extraordinary deal for its trade deficit dollar in 2005 a net
balance of some US$200 billion of low-cost, high-quality Chinese
goods that expanded the purchasing power of US consumers. If,
however, Washington politicians now choose to close down trade with
China by imposing high tariffs or forcing a major Chinese currency
revaluation - precisely the intent of legislation proposed by US
Senators Schumer and Graham - those actions could easily
backfire.
Remove the China supply line, and the trade deficit for a
saving-short US economy won't shrink as populist politicians
suggest. Instead, due to America's oversized external funding
needs, the trade deficit would remain large and merely gravitate to
another foreign producer - most likely, one with a higher cost
structure. Such a shift in America's external sourcing would amount
to the functional equivalent of a tax on the American consumer.
The current political boil raises a critical question: Can a
savings-short US select its lenders as well as dictate the terms of
its external financing needs? The simple answer to the first part
of the question is, "yes" - targeted protectionist actions can,
indeed, redirect the sources of external commerce and funding.
Through the Schumer-Graham tariffs, the US could tilt the mix of
its trade patterns away from China.
Such actions would do nothing, however, to address the basic
problem. As long as the US economy is locked on a sub-par domestic
saving path, it is hooked increasingly on the "kindness of
strangers" to provide the sustenance of its economic growth - both
in terms of foreign-made goods as well as financial capital.
Country-specific protectionist actions would "succeed" only in
shifting America's trade deficit and concomitant capital surplus
elsewhere in the world.
There's an even darker side to the recent protectionist backlash
in the United States - the crass politics of scapegoating. The
ongoing angst of middle-class American workers has become a
political football -even with the national unemployment rate below
5 percent. It's not hard to figure out why. A US labor market that
was once trapped in a jobless recovery is now mired in a wageless
recovery - generating an extraordinary stagnation of real wages
even in the face of strong productivity growth.
At the same time, the United States is suffering from a record
trade deficit, whose largest bilateral piece is with China. That's
all it takes for politicians to point the finger at China as being
responsible for the trade-related pressures bearing down on
beleaguered US workers. With mid-term elections looming in the
United States, I suspect this protectionist posturing could well
intensify in the months ahead.
But who is really to blame in all this? At the end of the day,
America's saving shortfall - the origin of potentially
destabilizing capital and trade flows - is a by-product of
conscious choices made by the US body politic. The Federal budget
deficit, which has accounted for the bulk of the plunge in national
saving over the past six years, is made in Washington not in
Beijing. The negative personal saving rate is partly an outgrowth
of pro-consumption tax policies again, made in Washington.
America's elected representatives are the source of resistance to
tax reforms, such as a consumption tax, that might address the
deficiencies of private saving. Of course, politicians never want
to admit that they are the problem.
Instead, they prefer to pin the blame on others in this case,
China or Dubai, in the case of the recent political firestorm over
its proposed acquisition of East Coast shipping facilities.
Meanwhile, the United States does next to nothing to shoulder
its share of the problem a staggering shortfall of domestic
savings. Such political posturing is a recipe for serious trouble,
in my view.
The author is Chief Economist at Morgan Stanley. This is an
excerpt from his speech at the China Development Forum in Beijing
on March 19-20.
(China Daily March 23, 2006)
