By Gong Shaopeng
The Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas, emerged
from the January 26 Palestinian legislative elections as the
victor. It won 76 of the 132 available seats, enough for it to form
a government on its own. In stark contrast, the long dominant
faction led by the Fatah movement won only 43 seats, forcing the
cabinet of Ahmed Qurei to resign en masse.
Shocking as it was to the rest of the world, Hamas' win should
in no way be seen as a surprise.
The latest legislative elections were conducted in a combination
of two formats: proportional representation for a nationwide single
constituency and majority representation for small town
constituencies. That means 66 seats were distributed among all
political parties in proportion to the number of votes each won in
Gaza and the West Bank, while each of the other 66 went to
candidates who received simple majority support in their small town
constituencies.
The Hamas movement is a religious-group-turned-political party
that has been doing charity work around local mosques where its
branches are based. It is therefore only logical that it would win
nearly all of the small town seats.
But for the Fatah movement, which has alienated itself from the
masses by indulging in complacency, winning more than half of the
66 seats in the nationwide single constituency was obviously far
from enough to avert a crushing defeat when results from both
fronts were put together. Small wonder then that Nahmoud Abbas,
Fatah chairman and president of the Palestinian government, invited
Hamas to form a new government as soon as the official election
results were out.
Since it was established in 1987, Hamas has never recognized the
legitimacy of Israel. Nor does it agree with the Oslo Treaty that
Fatah signed with Israel, or the Quartet Roadmap Plan. Its military
arm also frequently launches suicide bomb attacks against Israeli
targets. If a "Hamas administration" comes to power in Palestine,
all parties involved in the Middle East peace process will face a
huge dilemma.
Motivated by the belief that democracy is one of the ultimate
means of ridding the world of terrorism, the Bush administration
has been enthusiastically promoting its "democratic solution" in
the Middle East. It persuaded other parties to agree to Hamas'
participation in the Palestinian elections, despite the fact that
it still sees the militant group as a terrorist organization.
Having considered every other possibility but a Hamas win,
however, the White House was compelled to join the other three
parties of the quartet that drew up the Middle East Peace Roadmap
(the European Union, Russia and the United Nations) in demanding
that Hamas disarm itself, recognize Israel and respect the Quartet
Roadmap, or it would completely stop all assistance to Palestine.
Hamas, as expected, rejected the US demands immediately.
Hamas' shocking victory will also be felt in the Israeli
parliamentary elections on March 28. Since he ordered a unilateral
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August last year, Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon has seen his popularity soar at home. In
order to shake free from the constraints set by the Benjamin
Netanyahu-led faction of the Likud Party, Sharon formed his own
Forward Party in late 2005. Political pundits then predicted
Sharon's popularity would be able to help his party win enough
votes in the March elections to become the top dog and form a
government.
The situation completely changed after Sharon was hospitalized
on January 4 following a serious stroke. He remains in a deep coma,
leaving all duties to his second-in-charge, Ehud Olmert.
If a "Hamas administration" that refuses to negotiate with
Israel comes to power in Palestine, it might cost the Forward Party
the edge over its rivals in the upcoming elections. The hardliners
led by Netanyahu could then re-dominate Israeli politics and stop
or even reverse the Middle East peace process.
In contrast to external anxiety, Abbas has appeared rather calm
so far. By inviting Hamas to form a new government, he in fact
kicked the "awkward ball" from under the feet of Hamas, whose lack
of administrative experience and capable bureaucrats will only
spoil their electoral triumph.
Particularly clear is the certain loss of at least US$1.96
billion in annual aid to cover administrative expenses, which means
a dead government, if Hamas does not change its ways. The prospect
prompted Hamas to propose a joint government with Fatah, but was
quickly snubbed. According to the law, Abbas is authorized to
invite Fatah to form a new government if Hamas could not do it
within two months after the elections.
To put it simply, whether there will be a "Hamas administration"
in Palestine remains a question at the moment. Some people may
think that inviting Hamas to form a new government was a smart move
by Abbas, but it was also a dangerous one, if for nothing else but
this foreseeable scenario: a Fatah cabinet practically paralyzed by
the Hamas-led opposition from the start.
The Palestine-Israel peace process has been in limbo for so long
that any further delay because of the political uncertainty in
Palestine will only nudge it closer to doom.
The author is a professor at the Beijing Institute of
Foreign Relations.
?
(China Daily February 6, 2006)
?
