By Guo Yanyuan
After leaving the Six-party nuclear talks, exploding an underground nuclear device and carrying out short-range missile tests, the North Korea began to follow a contradictory policy in its efforts to improve its regional and international security position. It softened its stance towards other countries, while simultaneously continuing its efforts to weaponize plutonium.
Weaponizing plutonium shows the North Korea has made great progress in its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang has also announced it is on the threshold of mastering uranium enrichment, which implies it is trying to develop a range of nuclear weapons. Having devoted massive resources to its weapons programs, North Korea may be seen as a destabilizing factor in Northeast Asia, but its motives are to consolidate its national security.
With the Northeast Asia security environment once again plunged into confusion, all the parties involved seem weary and helpless. Everyone is waiting on North Korea's next move. US special envoy Stephen Bosworth recently visited China, South Korea and Japan, trying to achieve a common stance on the North Korea nuclear issue. All four countries stuck to their position that the issue must be dealt with within the framework of the Six-party talks, and that any bilateral talks must also take place within the Six-party framework.
North Korea-US bilateral talks within the Six-party framework would favor both the North and the US. The two countries would be happy to carry on bilateral talks and the results of the talks could be ratified within the Six-party framework. After all, the Six-party talks have achieved considerable progress in building confidence and advancing regional stability.
The lessening of tension between the North and South Korea does not indicate the North is ready to change its nuclear policy, but it is a sign that it is looking for a way to break the nuclear deadlock. The South Korea has failed to set the agenda in relations with its neighbor and has made little progress in advancing the bilateral relationship. Promises of economic aid have been insufficient to cajole the North into giving up nuclear ambitions.
North Korea has always maintained that the Six-party talks, by concentrating exclusively on its nuclear program, are one-sided, and should be extended to cover other Northeast Asia security issues. It was on this issue that Pyongyang announced it was to quit the Six-party talks permanently. It seems extremely unlikely North Korea could be persuaded to re-enter the Six-party process without a change of name or an extension of the scope of the talks.
One solution might be to rename the Six-party talks as the Northeast Asia nuclear issues talks, while retaining the focus on the North Korea nuclear issue. A helpful aspect is that North Korea is part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with which the other five parties are also affiliated. Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue could be implemented as ARF inter-session meetings, with China as coordinator. ASEAN could be an observer at the talks. After all, North Korea has indicated it is favorable to an "ASEAN solution" to regional issues.
Another option might be to expand talks to include nuclear proliferation issues in other countries of the region, including South Korea and Japan. The recently-exposed secret nuclear agreement between Japan and the US alarmed not only North Korea, but also China and other neighboring countries. Japan's civil nuclear capabilities are also a cause for concern to North Korea. And US nuclear weapons in the region constitute a real threat to the North. All these are reasons why nuclear proliferation issues in Northeast Asia should be dealt with comprehensively.
The name and structure of the Six-party talks may be changed, but the important thing is that the spirit of the talks must be retained and resumed. Whatever forms the talks take, all Northeast Asia security issues should be taken into consideration. Only if this approach is taken will North Korea feel reassured about its national security.
(China.org.cn September 9, 2009)
