By Dr. Jin Liangxiang
On August 5, 2009, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in to his second term as Iran's President by the Majlis, but the country's post-election political troubles have not ended. The fierce competition between candidates and the post-election political tensions reflect a deep-rooted social and political crisis. Electoral fraud cannot fully explain reformists' defeat. On the contrary, the large margin by which conservative radicals won the election was to a large extent due to institutional reasons.
There is no denying that Iran's Islamic revolution 30 years ago was modern rather than backward since it absorbed the political achievements of other civilizations. Unlike other countries in the region, Iran established a political system based on a division of powers. On the other hand, the Islamic system is also traditional and conservative. Many positions and institutions such as the Supreme leader, the Guardian Council and the Judiciary are rooted in religion. They not only have a final say on major issues but also can shape the public opinion. It is because he shares their views on many issues that Ahmadinejad finally won the election by a significant margin.
A mature electoral system that reflects the wishes of the majority of the population is the benchmark of modern political system. But survival and success also depend on whether a system also takes into consideration the interests and demands of minorities. Iran cannot escape the consequences of this universal rule.
The current political system was established in an era of revolution when domestic political demands were simple and public opinion relatively united. But today's situation is quite different. Social differentiation has continued, albeit at a slower in pace than in other countries as a result of 30 year's diplomatic isolation and economic sanction. If Iran's Islamic elite cannot adjust the political system to take account of new realities, and in particular to make it more tolerant, the dissatisfaction of the reformists will continue to grow and Iran's domestic conflicts will continue indefinitely.
The urban middle class and intellectuals, though a minority, are growing stronger. They are demanding more social and political freedom, and are well aware that their income and job opportunities are closely related to the nation's foreign policy. The generation born after the revolution is now a major influence in politics and women are increasingly interested in the outside world.
The strata that form the bedrock of reformist support live in the major cities at the center of Iran's political and social life, are well-educated, articulate and more enthusiastic about political participation than other social layers. Their dissatisfaction is a serious threat to the prevailing political and social order. That's why, following the election, the defeated reformists have been able to launch the most serious political protest and resistance since the Islamic revolution.
This is not to say that reformists have the support of conservative pragmatists. Mainly consisting of various kinds of entrepreneurs with religious backgrounds, the pragmatists control a significant chunk of Iran's economy. Their chief representative, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, holds the important position of Chairman of the Assembly of Experts.
In sum, neither the approval of the Supreme Leader nor the oath of inauguration will mark the end of post-election contention. The new domestic landscape is going to be a tough test both for Ahmadinejad and the elites of the body politic.
Dr. Jin Liangxiang is a Research Fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies.
(China.org.cn August 6, 2009)
