The Abu Ghraib prison atrocities are exacerbating an already
dangerous situation in Iraq.?
Morally and politically, the damage and fallout of the abuse
crisis are considerable.
One of the major repercussions is Iraqis' further loss of trust
of the American-led occupation. More and more Iraqis say they have
little confidence and faith in the willingness of the United States
to assist them in resolving their country's complex problems
establishing an authentic government that reflects their hopes and
culture. Reports from Iraq show more Iraqis now view the US-led
occupation as part of the problem, not the solution.
Before the revelation of the abuses of Iraqi prisoners, a USA
Today/CNN poll conducted throughout Iraq found that 57 percent of
Iraqis said that American and British troops should leave Iraq
immediately, even though 53 percent said that they would feel less
safe. In contrast, a few months ago a majority of Iraqis said they
wanted American and British troops to remain in the country until
the transfer of sovereignty.
Also alarming is that 71 percent of Iraqis said they now view
the coalition forces as "occupiers," not "liberators," compared
with 43 percent immediately after the invasion. A majority of
Iraqis also said they trust the United Nations more than the United
States to act as an impartial broker and to assist them in forming
a representative government.
Therefore, the alleged abuses of Iraqi prisoners could not have
come at a worse time for the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority
in Iraq. They have poured fuel on an already raging fire in Iraq
and the Arab arena.
Deep anger and boiling rage
In my conversations with Iraqis and Arabs, I sensed deep anger
and boiling rage. Their response to the prisoner scandal ranged
from shock to resignation. But unlike their American counterparts,
many Iraqis do not seem to be surprised that their countrymen were
abused by American soldiers.
The revelations reinforced their perceptions that Americans have
little respect for their culture or dignity and often use
disproportionate force to crush their will. In this sense, the
scandal has widened the cultural gulf between Iraqis and US troops
and complicated further America's efforts to transfer "limited
sovereignty" to Iraqis and tighten its hold on Iraq's future.
Field reports also paint gloomy portraits of Iraqis' darkening
mood, which does not portend well for the American-led occupation.
Deteriorating security, widespread unemployment (more than 50
percent), and rising civilian casualties have driven more Iraqis to
join the armed insurgency. According to American military
commanders, fewer and fewer Iraqis are supplying coalition forces
with intelligence about insurgents.
As more Iraqis get estranged from the American-led occupation,
the United States finds itself locked in a two-front (Sunni and
Shiite) costly urban guerrilla war with no end in sight.
It is not fully clear yet if the escalation of violence has more
to do with the approaching deadline for the transfer of power to
Iraqis or with a genuine nationalist uprising. But Bush
administration officials continue to underestimate the gravity of
the Sunni and Shiite uprising and the widening and deepening of
dissatisfaction among Iraqis.
Prisoner scandal
Recent reports from various Iraqi cities show a restive
population fed up with the status quo. If not handled correctly,
the crisis over Iraqi prisoners could push many neutral Iraqis to
the opposition camp.
Militants of all political persuasions, inside and outside Iraq,
are already using and abusing the scandal to fan anti-Americanism
and to call for revenge. Iraq appears to have become a recruiting
tool, if not a recruiting ground yet, for al Qaeda and those
opposed to American policies in the region.
The prisoner crisis, in particular, is a welcome development for
al Qaeda and its affiliates which will exploit it to justify its
broader war against America and its pro-Muslim allies.
In the next few months, the potential for armed escalation is
very real. Gen. John Abizaid, the overall commander of operations
in Iraq, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, he expects an
increase in violence after the transfer of power to Iraqis at the
end of June. The assassination of the rotating president of the
Iraqi Governing Council, Ezzedine Salim, is a case in point. The
gruesome beheading of Nicholas Berg could be an omen of bad things
to come.
Militants will likely try to outdo each other in attacking
Americans and their allies in Iraq and beyond, pretending to punish
the United States for its alleged abuse of Arabs or Muslims, and
for trampling on their honor and humanity.
Minimizing damage
Although there exists no magic wand that could immediately wipe
out the stain of the abuse crisis, American officials must take
concrete steps to limit its reverberations.
President Bush's partial apology to the Iraqi victims is a good
step on the long road to healing. Also important was the high level
visit to Iraq by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the
military brass and his statement in Baghdad that there will be no
"cover-up."
But on their own, these gestures will unlikely allay the fears
of Iraqis or put their lingering suspicions to rest. Full
accountability and transparency will be much more effective than
words.
It is also not enough to hold a few rogue American soldiers
accountable. The abuse scandal reflects a bigger political and
moral failure on the highest levels in the Defense Department.
Although President Bush decided against sacking Rumsfeld and is
trying to weather the storm of public opinion at home and abroad,
he must insist on full transparency of the investigation and full
accountability as well. Nothing less will do. Americans and Iraqis
are entitled to know how systematic, extensive and widespread the
abuses were, and to know the responsibility of senior civilian and
uniformed officials in the Defense Department and the military.
More than anything else, establishing the facts and meting
justice will go a long way to rebuilding broken bridges of trust
with Iraqis and Arabs.
Power transfer
On a broader level, the United States would magnify, not
resolve, its problems if it limits the exercise of sovereignty by
the new "caretaker government." Last week, The Wall Street Journal
quoted US officials in charge of the transfer plan as saying the
new government "will have little control over its armed forces,
lack the ability to make or change laws and be unable to make major
decisions within specific ministries without tacit US
approval."
A transfer of power by name only will further deepen Iraqis'
mistrust and drive many of them into armed resistance. The transfer
of power to Iraqis must be credible and genuine. The logic of the
American-led occupation must be replaced with the logic of a
legitimate Iraqi authority sanctioned and supported by the United
Nations, with the active participation of the world community.
Empowering Iraqis and sharing the burden of reconstruction in
Iraq with the international community will serve vital American
interests, not just peace and stability in the Arab heartland.
(China Daily via agencies, May 24, 2004)