Operators of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan failed to implement international nuclear safety standards designed to mitigate damage caused by earthquakes and tsunamis, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report said last week.

Japanese nuclear officials also failed to quickly evacuate nearby residents after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami damaged the Fukushima Daiichi plant, which was against the United Nations agency's standards. Nor did they build enough levels of protection to contain the damage and radiation leak that accident could cause.

The earthquake, tsunami and nuclear leakage, or the triple disaster, have not only created the most severe postwar national crisis in Japan, but also affected neighboring countries, especially China and South Korea.

Battling with the nuclear leak, the Japanese government poured about 10,000 tons of radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi plant into the Pacific Ocean in April, spreading the crisis possibly to other countries. Though Japanese media reports said Japan had sought the United States' permission three days before dumping the radioactive water, it informed its neighbors only after doing so. The incident highlights the structural defects in traditional response to non-traditional security threats in the Northeast Asian region.

Japan's failure shows that non-traditional security threats cannot be tackled by one country alone and makes it necessary for China, Japan and South Korea to establish a cooperative mechanism to deal with non-traditional security threats such as nuclear proliferation or nuclear leaks.

Leaders of China, Japan and South Korea met at their fourth summit in Tokyo in May and agreed to "strengthen information-sharing and communication on nuclear security". The three countries' leaders have realized the severe threat that natural disasters pose to nuclear safety and security, and agreed that the development of nuclear energy should be based on the premise of guaranteed nuclear security and the "safety first" principle.

The three countries have decided to intensify their dialogue on nuclear security and ways to deal with natural disasters, such as contingency plans, corresponding measures, and problems related to nuclear safety and security. They agreed that proper communication and sharing of information are very important for establishing and maintaining confidence, and the safe operation of nuclear facilities.

The leaders decided to enhance cooperation and build a network that would enable them to notify other countries about nuclear accidents in time, encourage more exchange of experts, and disseminate real-time information on atmospheric flow during such accidents.

The agreement among the three countries' leaders signifies the political will of the their governments to respond appropriately to "nuclear accidents" and other non-traditional security threats. This should lay the political foundation of a systematic mechanism. But the cooperation in nuclear security discussed by the leaders in Tokyo is only part of a framework, not concrete points to build a system.

Given their similar geographical attributes and common political will, China, Japan and South Korea should expedite the shift in their "security paradigm" to deal effectively with non-traditional security threats such as a nuclear crisis. For that, the new nuclear security mechanism should be based on mutual trust and benefit, equality and cooperation.

The three countries, however, have to overcome some obstacles to shift their focus from traditional to non-traditional security outlook.

First, they have to raise the status of non-traditional security threats from a low- to high-level political issue in terms of strategy. Traditionally, important strategic decisions on defense, diplomacy and war have been high-level political issues, while problems such as environmental pollution, climate change and welfare are low-level issues. But the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis has proved how important it is to coordinate and cooperate on issues of safety and security in nuclear power plants.

Second, China, Japan and South Korea have to make specific arrangements to strengthen their cooperation in nuclear security, which would enrich the mechanism. They should initiate concrete negotiations and agree to cooperate in matters of organization, personnel allocation, scale, principle and objectives. The aim of institutional arrangement is to protect its member countries' interests, for which the three countries have to bargain, coordinate and compromise.

And finally, they have to make efforts to reduce the negative impact that Japan's political instability has had on nuclear cooperation.

Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan may be forced to resign soon, and the ruling Democratic Party of Japan could find it difficult to revitalize the economy and rebuild the disaster-stricken areas in a short time. So to ensure smooth nuclear cooperation among the three countries, technocrats, not politicians, from Japan - and their counterparts from China and South Korea - should run the cooperation mechanism. Only professional-level cooperation can guarantee undisturbed and long-term cooperation in nuclear safety and security.