by Shi Yongming
It has been six months since the first round of the six-party talks on the Korean nuclear issue was held in Beijing last August, and a second round of talks has long been in the cards. Now, due to intensified shuttle diplomacy and efforts by all sides, the situation has taken a favorable turn with the recent announcement that February 25 had been set as the date for the resumption of the talks.
The past six months have witnessed both the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) making increased efforts toward eliminating the differences in their approaches to this issue. After the first round talks in August 2003, the bottom-line between the two sides lay in whether Washington is willing to pay Pyongyang a security guarantee for its commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program, as well as whether the two sides should fulfill their commitments simultaneously. When attending the APEC economic leaders' meeting in Bangkok last October, US President George W. Bush relented and expressed his readiness to consider providing a security guarantee to the DPRK under a multinational framework. At the beginning of this year, the DPRK further confirmed its willingness to freeze all its nuclear projects. The statement has been well received by the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).
However, the DPRK's confirmation came with an explicit condition. It demanded the United States to adopt the "first-phase measures of the package solution" that were brought about by the DPRK to resolve the nuclear crisis. The United States welcomed the DPRK's announcement to freeze its nuclear program, but stressed it had made no breakthrough. Washington later reiterated that the DPRK should give up its nuclear program in "an effective, verifiable and irreversible way." It is obvious that disagreements between the United States and the DPRK are still distinct. The two nations are seeking the possibility of narrowing their apparent differences and exploring each other's policies for advantages that will mean having a greater say at the negotiation table.
Some changes in the international arena are influencing the decision making process of the two sides. As for the Bush administration, the Korean nuclear issue has always been part of its global anti-proliferation strategy. Therefore, the US's DPRK policy has been out of consideration of a global strategy.
Imposing sanctions and blockades are a major mean for the United States to deal with hostile nations accused of proliferating nuclear secrets. Last December, after months of secret negotiations with the United States and Britain, Libya announced it would abandon weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical arms, in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. In the process, Libya had also disclosed an underground proliferation network linked to Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's "father of the nuclear bomb." Encouraged by this, Washington expects the DPRK will follow suit.
But the DPRK had firmly declined to follow Libya's example. Pyongyang regards US hostility as the root cause of the nuclear issue and therefore a change in US attitude would be premise to the DPRK's abandoning its nuclear program.
To have a better say at the negotiation table, the DPRK has been making peripheral preparations to ease pressures from the United States. While agreeing to take part in the six-party talks beginning on February 25, the DPRK is discussing with the ROK to further promote bilateral economic cooperation. As to its relations with Japan, the DPRK has also taken a flexible attitude to temporarily put aside their disputes over the hostage issue. The ease of tensions between the DPRK and Japan has created the necessary conditions for the continuation of the six-party talks.
The second round talks bear more important tasks than the first. Its significance especially lies in that it should fix the direction of the future talks and lay a favorable foundation to final success. The talks should focus on the target of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as maintaining lasting peace and stability and promoting economic development of the region. It has drawn worldwide attention whether the participants can reach initial consensus on the basic goal, principle and methods of the talks, and confirm these in the form of a document.
In light of the results of the first round talks, the second round talks should focus on at least two issues. First, the US should commit an effective framework to address the DPRK's security concerns. Second, the DPRK should commit to give up its nuclear program in a verifiable manner. Although there should be no disagreements over the two issues in principle, they can only be convincing through reliable implementation.
As for the current situation, both the United States and the DPRK added provisos on their commitments to each other. The United States asked the DPRK to first abandon its nuclear program effectively, verifiably and irreversibly. It did this for two reasons. First, the United States holds that the DPRK's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program is crucial to solving the Korean nuclear issue. On the other hand, it worries that the DPRK does not want to abandon the program cordially, while the United States would be obliged, once giving the DPRK security commitment, and therefore lack measures to press the DPRK in the future, should it be necessary. Libya's surrender has convinced the United States of the effectiveness of a hard-line policy. During the coming talks, whether the United States adopts a practical and flexible or self-opinioned manner will bear on the success or failure of the talks. A wise choice for the United States lies in the pursuit of a practical objective-getting nuclear non-proliferation on the peninsula written on a common document, instead of being tied down by its conditional phrasings.
What the DPRK wants is to get not only security guarantee, but also economic compensation, while abandoning its nuclear weapon program. On the aspect of security guarantee, a major problem is the implementation form and methods, which will involve many negotiations on details. The second round of talks can barely resolve all the problems. The DPRK's practical objective is to make a guarantee to its security concerns acceptable to all parties and be formally documented. However, it may confront big troubles on the issue of economic compensation. It seems the United States has shown no policy adjustment in this field so far, for it considers the requirement blackmail. Meanwhile, the United States wants to entice the DPRK to follow the trail of Libya. On February 3, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that the United States and Libya would hold talks on normalization of bilateral relations. But it is hard to say if the tactic will work or not. The DPRK at most may show more flexibility at the negotiation table, but it is almost impossible for the country to emulate Libya.
Features of the DPRK nuclear issue decide that there is a great likelihood to be a package resolution. But that does not mean gradual advances cannot take place on the way to the goal. The world will follow the second round talks from two aspects. First, whether documented consensus can be reached on the goal, principle and methods to resolve the problem, and whether documents that can direct follow-up talks can be drawn up. Second, whether specialized organizations can be established to solve technical problems during the negotiations. Once these two objectives are achieved, the talks can be called a success.
(The author is with the China Institute of International Studies.)
(Beijing Review February 18, 2004)
