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The White House and 10 Downing Street owe their countries and the whole world an explanation on where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are.
Before and during the Iraq War, US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair had all along kept telling the world that they had evidence that Iraq had WMD. Until now no trace of such weapons has turned up.
The coalition forces' failure, thus far, to find them invalidates the two countries' intelligence indicating that Iraq had the clandestine capacity to build them.
Since former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's WMD were one of the principal, stated reasons for the legally controversial war, their absence is, a social faux pas at best, or a political lie at worst.
Doubts about the claims the US and British officials made over Saddam's WMD and their imminent threat to world security are mounting.
As a result, came the investigations on whether the advocates of war in the White House and Downing Street have exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq and concocted the intelligence concerning alleged Iraqi WMD.
In the world political arena, it is essential that the matter be examined.
A replay of the claims that Bush and Blair made before the war is the most telling of witnesses.
In the foreword of the British Government's assessment report on Iraq's WMD, Prime Minister Blair told his country "a current and serious threat to the UK national interest" was posed.
The 55-page document published on September 24, 2002 reported 'evidence' that Saddam was continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.
Such a warning was based on the statement that "Saddam's military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."
Blair told Parliament: "What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme."
Equally emphatic were the dossiers delivered by the US on Iraq's WMD.
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq said Saddam's regime had chemical and biological weapons and an active programme to develop a nuclear weapon. This document served as part of the Bush administration's justification for going to war.
In recent months, however, the US administration's handling of intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons programmes and its links to al-Qaida have come under increased scrutiny on Capitol Hill, with some leading US Democrats charging that the administration overstated the case against Saddam by publicizing intelligence that supported its policy and keeping contradictory information under wraps.
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry went so far as to claim the US President lied to him and his country. Kerry had sided with the Bush administration before the war.
On June 18, Kerry criticized the US President for eating his words on building an international coalition against Saddam and waging a war based on questionable intelligence.
On June 25 a US intelligence official revealed that a former Iraqi nuclear scientist had provided American authorities parts and documents from Saddam's nuclear weapons programme from over 12 years ago.
The official was quick to acknowledge the find was not the elusive "smoking gun" the US authorities seek to prove the Bush administration's claims that Iraq had an active programme to develop a nuclear weapon.
Since the war ended, the US teams looking for proof of Iraq's alleged chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes have been chasing leads and tips from Iraqis who stand to gain reward money on offer to those who supply such evidence.
Under mounting pressure from investigations at home, the language concerning Iraq's possession and development of WMD by US and British leaders is changing.
The latest weekly radio speech by Bush on June 21 revealed a subtle alteration.
Bush vowed to discover "the true extent" of Saddam's weapons programmes, no matter how long it takes.
Bush has retreated from convictions that banned Iraqi weapons would be found, promising only to find the "true extent" of Saddam's weapons programmes.
His comments contrast with earlier declarations. In March he said: "Intelligence gathered by this, and other governments, leaves no doubt that the Iraqi regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
US Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska said on June 19 questions about the US pre-war weapons intelligence in the House hearings have raised doubts about America's credibility.
Hagel, a member of the House Intelligence and Foreign Relations committees, said if the US enlisted weapons inspectors from the United Nations (UN) to help verify any findings on Iraq's WMD, it "would significantly enhance America's credibility in the world."
Turning a blind eye to the three assessment reports by UN chief inspector Hans Blix, the US and Britain presented "the strong case" based on intelligence from their agents and allies. That largely pre-dated the Bush administration claims that Iraq maintained WMD programmes.
Blix's reports to the Security Council on January 27, February 14 and March 7 did not make a case for war against Iraq. Baghdad was asked to co-operate more effectively with UN inspectors.
The US asks for more time to continue its hunt in Iraq and yet it refused the same latitude to UN arms inspectors prior to launching an attack.
The war, a choice by the US and its allies, was politics, pure and simple.
For the US and its allies, these weapons were not an issue.
The Bush administration "assured" the world that WMD would inevitably be found.
And when these weapons went undiscovered, the administration began to argue that it did not matter whether Iraq did, or did not have such weapons posing a threat to the US, because Saddam was a repressive ruler and it was good that the world was rid of him.
The war on terror, which was, and is still recognized and supported by the world community, has been conveniently hijacked by the allied forces to bring about regime change.
This volte-face raises serious questions today.
First, about American politics. Speaking to the US House of Representatives on June 10, 2003, John Conyers argued the power of Congress to declare war was usurped.
"I have seen the American people apparently deceived into supporting invasion of a sovereign nation, in violation of the UN Charter and international law, on the basis of what now appears to be false assurances," he said.
Conyers declared that the consent of the governed was obtained by manipulation rather than candid persuasion.
Conyers maintained that the President and his cabinet knew that in some cases those discredited sources' assertions were flatly contradicted by the professional assessments of the experts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the State Department, and were only supported by a rogue special office established under Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld precisely to "find" or reinterpret intelligence to support the administration's determination to invade Iraq.
According to Conyers, they cannot succeed with this deception because they cannot outrun the truth. There are too many previous contradictory statements, too many reports leaked by outraged veteran intelligence analysts, and too great a record of established facts.
The US administration's arrogantly crafted script is unravelling.
Second, when American politics extend beyond its border, especially when the politics are dirty and doubtful, is there a check mechanism for the world? The United Nations was designed to play that role. But that was shattered when the allied forces bypassed the UN.
The question is especially acute at this time because Bush has hammered out his doctrine of "preventive war."
Will that advocacy be based on deception and false statements, too?
The prospect is frightening.
The international credibility of American assertions based on military intelligence are now of zero value.
"When we make claims about other countries - as we are now doing about Iran - not a soul will believe them, even when they happen to be true. At this point, Americans should not believe them either," said Conyers.
(China Daily July 2, 2003)
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