The possibility of a US-Japan-Taiwan political and military alliance has become a hot topic in the media recently.  

Given that US-Taiwan military ties were expanded and deepened and Taiwan pro-independence forces have strengthened efforts to develop closer relations with rightists in Japan, the eyeball-grabbing notion is not without basis, to be sure, but it ignores many important factors.

In this sense, the media should be warned against the risk of exaggeration, especially when the media make comments on sensitive issues, because sensational wordings are likely to become self-fulfilling prophecies. That can risk exerting negative impacts on Sino-US and Sino-Japan relations, as well as complicating the Taiwan question.

Several post-Cold War trends have made some scholars begin to predict a US-Japan-Taiwan alliance directed at China is probably in the offing.

To begin with, the theory of democracy and peace and the idea of building a new international order that has the "democratic" community as its core has gained wide support. Since the 1980s, the rightists and leftists in the United States have come to accept the theory of "democratic" peace and the necessity of expanding American style democracy.

The Americans regard it their calling to spread the values of "democracy" and "freedom" in the world. After the Cold War, the neo-conservatists have gradually gained the upper hand in foreign policy-making. They stress that the United States is strong enough to promote "democratic" transitions and that such transitions can be achieved in short periods. The liberals believe that the "community of democracies" constitutes the foundation of the international order dominated by the United States.

Then, since the mid-1970s, the US Congress has exerted ever-increasing influence over Washington's policy-making in foreign affairs. In the US Congress, there have long existed strong pro-Taiwan forces. In recent years, the formation of a Taiwan Caucus, the establishment of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and the passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement bill, all indicate that the congressional influence over US policy towards Taiwan is on the rise.

Finally, the Taiwan question has increasingly become the dominant factor in place of the historic problem that influences Sino-Japan relations.

Recently, calls for stronger relations with Taiwan have obtained growing support in Japan, which is putting the basic principles enshrined in the three political documents signed by China and Japan to a severe test. Japan emphasizes that Taiwan has completed its "democratization" and entered the WTO, and upgrading the level of the relations with Taiwan is in line with the changed times.

Furthermore, Japan fails to clarify whether the US-Japan defense cooperation guideline applies to Taiwan, which objectively backs the Taiwan separatist forces.

Against this background favorable to Taiwan independence, the Taiwan separatist forces frequently play their democracy cards to strengthen efforts in gaining support from the rightists in Japan and the United States. The Taiwan authorities earnestly expect the formation of a US-Japan-Taiwan alliance, which Taiwan can look to for support in its independence attempts.

However, despite the trends in favor of a strategic triangle between Japan, the US and Taiwan, there are some other important factors that will prevent the alliance from coming into being.

After September 11, the United States shifted its global strategy focus to fighting terrorism and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially preventing the combination of terrorists and WMD, and stopping "failed" states from providing a haven for terrorists. Over the 10 years following the end of the Cold War, the United States has realized that effectively fighting terrorism needs the cooperation of the international community, especially major powers. The events of September 11 open vast opportunities for cooperation between China and the United States on the issue of counter-terrorism.

The Taiwan question plays only a secondary role in US foreign strategy and Washington's Taiwan policy is subordinate to the overall strategy towards China.

After the Cold War, the US Democrats and Republicans have come to a consensus over the policy towards China, namely that strategic engagement rather than containment should be the goal. This shows the United States believes that China amid its reform and integration within international society will not become a US enemy.

When it comes to cross-Straits relations, however, the United States tilts towards Taiwan, even though it professes that it will not support Taiwan's independence since Washington knows full well that supporting any Taiwan attempt for independence will lead to serious consequences.

Moreover, in the 21st century, Japan still follows the United States interests in its security policy. Many of Japan's policies reflect the interpretation of the United States. In addition, the United States also dictates Japan's stances on the Taiwan question. Although some problems are disturbing Sino-Japan relations, both countries are aware that China and Japan can collaborate in regional and global affairs and should develop mutually beneficial bilateral relationships.

In 1997, China raised a new security concept. To put the new concept of security into practice and, more important, dispel the foreign concerns about China's future role in global affairs, China initiated a series of efforts, including deep engagement in international community, active participation in Asian integration, and carrying out good neighbor policies, which some US scholars hailed as "China's new diplomacy."

With China's influence in the international arena rapidly expanding, China again comes up with the concept of a peaceful rise, which is intended to show that China will not adopt an anti-US policy, that China will fulfill its international obligations, and that China will choose a path of peaceful development.

China's insistence on no confrontation with the United States and the use of force only as the last resort on the Taiwan question will make any alliance that is designed to deal with China lose its legitimacy.

(China Daily August 26, 2004)