亚洲精品久久久久久一区二区_99re热久久这里只有精品34_久久免费高清视频_一区二区三区不卡在线视频

By Shen Dingli

Today, the world faces two important nuclear proliferation concerns: that which is playing out on the Korean Peninsula and that which is playing out in Iran.

Last October, North Korea declared that it had conducted a nuclear test. But this declaration has not yet been made sufficiently convincing.

Iran is taking a different road and has professed that it has no intentions of developing nuclear weapons. But, it is widely believed that it might have started taking its first steps toward nuclear development.

Today, Iran remains a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968 and took effect in 1970.

NPT was developed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy and assist both general and full nuclear disarmament. Since it was drafted, 187 parties have joined the treaty, including all five nuclear-weapon states.

According to the treaty, Iran should commit itself to refraining from the development of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Iran must report its significant nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By honoring this obligation, Iran clears its nuclear record and defends its rights to peaceful nuclear energy use.

However, the IAEA reports that Iran has failed to report its previous nuclear activity in a comprehensive and timely manner and demands Teheran answer for its past inconsistencies. Still, Iran has also failed to meet this requirement.

Subsequently, the IAEA referred this case to the United Nations Security Council, which passed Resolution 1737 last December. The resolution demands that Iran, "without further delay, suspend proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and work on all heavy water-related projects".

Three months later, on March 24, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a new resolution with tougher sanctions to pressure Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.

Co-sponsored by Britain, France and Germany, and incorporating some amendments proposed by Indonesia, Qatar and South Africa, Resolution 1747 urges Iran to suspend uranium enrichment "without further delay".

Including moderately harsher sanctions than those included in previous resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue, 1747 calls for a ban of Iranian arms exports and a freeze of the assets of an additional 28 individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

However, Iran has not fulfilled the UNSC's demands. Instead, it has begun operating its first batch of centrifuges for initiating uranium enrichment.

At a low level of enrichment, this action doesn't pose a serious problem. However, once uranium isotope 235 is enriched by more than 5 percent, Iran will not be physically distant from weapons-grade fissile materials.

The legacy of Pakistan's nuclear development demonstrates that with 3,000 operating centrifuges, a weapons-grade fissile material inventory can be developed within a few years.

However, many believe that Iran has exaggerated its capacity, boasting as much as 10 times its actual nuclear capability. These people believe that currently, Iran is actually running at a level of 300 plus centrifuges.

Should this prove true, the risk of military confrontation to be incurred under US preemption policy would become more distant. But some argue that Iran could later expand its centrifuge pool.

At the core of the matter is the actuality of Iran's intentions.

So far, the IAEA has been very careful about making its judgements. It has not reached any conclusions about an Iranian military nuclear program nor has it found sufficient evidence to prove its innocence.

Given these circumstances, Iran has continued to insist on its rights to civilian nuclear development, including work on a nuclear fuel cycle with uranium enrichment.

And it has disregarded various IAEA and UNSC resolutions.

The Western countries have not launched a military strike for a number of reasons. Currently, there is no solid proof of nuclear weapons development and the country seems to be ways from creating weapons-grade fissile material. Also, the United States is now spread thinly around the globe.

However, their patience could run even thinner than their forces. So, the international community must act swiftly in ultimately resolving the issue in a way that all parties find acceptable.

Iran wants to exercise its civilian nuclear rights, while the abuse of such rights could lead to the military application of atomic energy.

So, a peaceful resolution to this issue could come from a severance to the link of diversion. This would mean allowing the country the rights of nuclear operation for the purposes of generating power but not crossing the threshold to developing fissile materials.

Then, Iran could keep its uranium enrichment program as long as it was subject to the close and continuous surveillance of the international community. Most importantly, the IAEA must be able to monitor the enrichment levels or even have personnel onsite around the clock. This would foster and maintain absolute confidence within the international community that Iran's nuclear program would remain solely civilian.

And any nuclear waste to be produced by Iran's nuclear reactor should be transported and disposed of outside of the country, despite the possibility that Iran originally produced some of the fuel rods.

Removing the plutonium imbedded in Iran's spent fuel would alleviate all concerns about the risk of Iran developing a plutonium bomb.

The United States might be unwilling to accept Iran's rights to nuclear enrichment, but currently, Washington lacks the means or necessity to deal with Iran immediately.

Iran failed to respond to UNSC Resolution 1737 within 60 days of its passing on December 23 of last year. And last Saturday, it announced it would not halt its nuclear development despite the new resolution.

It knows all too well that no one is in any great hurry to wipe out a threat that isn't threatening enough, and no nation is willing to take the lead or pay the great cost of militarily engaging Iran at this time.

Over the past month, Iran has negotiated with the six powers in hopes of reaching an agreement acceptable to all parties, and there have even been talks of a potential meeting between top Iranian and US representatives.

Considering the current status of various restraints and differing interests among involved parties, it is unrealistic to assume that in this case, any single party could achieve its goals in a winner-takes-all fashion.

A more realistic and reasonable approach would be to recognize Iran's rights to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and accept its full range of rights to develop its nuclear fuel cycle.

In the meantime, the international community must closely and continuously monitor Iran's nuclear behavior and send a clear and credible message to the country: the development of any nuclear weapons program would have dire consequences.

The rest of the world must be determined to deal with the challenge Iran is presenting.

This is a complicated and unequal world, where the idea of equality often meets frustration.

While forbidding Iran to develop nuclear weapons, the United States is developing new types of nuclear weaponry, including the so-called "reliable replacement warhead".

While Teheran must be subjected to close IAEA inspections in order to fulfill its NPT obligations, and while the United States took a harsh stance towards North Korea before Pyongyang's nuclear test, Washington has moderated its behavior, given the new world realities.

The inequality of such changes educates Iran, sending the message that it should try its bet. However, the stakes are high, and the outcome could be disastrous.

Iran may or may not be as lucky as North Korea as it takes its nuclear path.

Although Iran may be able to inflict significant damage upon the United States in the case of a conflict, given its military resources, Teheran is still more likely to fail at least in the short run.

The author is a professor with the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.

(China Daily via agencies May 9, 2007)