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The transfer of sensitive materials and military equipment is
a major issue in the field of international arms control and disarmament
and one which China has consistently approached with the utmost
gravity.
China supports the three major goals set forth in the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament, and promoting
international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear
energy. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, pursuing a policy of
not supporting, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and not assisting any other country in the development
of such weapons. At the same time, China holds that preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons should not proceed without due
regard for the just rights and interests of all countries in the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in the case of developing
countries. There must not be a double standard whereby anti-nuclear
proliferation is used as a pretext to limit or retard the peaceful
use of nuclear energy by developing nations.
China holds that the safeguard regime of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is an important component of the efforts to
assure the effectiveness of the NPT. Even prior to acceding to the
treaty, China undertook to fulfill the obligations stipulated by
the IAEA Statute, including the obligation to apply IAEA safeguard.
Since 1992 when it became a party to the treaty, it has strictly
fulfilled all its obligations under the Treaty, including the obligation
to cooperate fully with the IAEA in safeguard application. China
follows three principles regarding nuclear exports: exports serving
peaceful use only, accepting IAEA's safeguards and no retransfers
to a third country without China's consent. Only specialized government-designated
companies can handle nuclear exports and in each instance they must
apply for approval from relevant governmental departments. All exports
of nuclear materials and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguard.
China has never exported sensitive technologies such as those for
uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production.
With a view to supporting IAEA safeguard, in November, 1991, China
officially declared that on a continuing basis it would report to
the IAEA any export to or import from non-nuclear-weapon states
involving nuclear materials of one effective kilogramme or above.
In July, 1993, China formally promised that it would voluntarily
report to the agency any imports or exports of nuclear materials,
and all exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials.
In 1985, China declared that it would of its own free will submit
part of its civilian nuclear facilities to the IAEA for safeguards.
In 1988 China and the IAEA signed an agreement on voluntary safeguard,
under which China provided the IAEA with a listing of facilities
subject to such safeguard and established SSAC. The system is supervised,
administered and operated respectively by the competent government
department, the facility concerned and technological support unit.
The competent government department is responsible for organizing
the implementation of the safeguard agreement between China and
the IAEA. The nuclear facility management is responsible for establishing
measurement, recording and reporting regimes in line with the requirements
of the agreement, as well as receiving on-site investigations by
IAEA inspectors.
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It does not produce or
possess chemical weapons. China was in the first group of countries
to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
and joined in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in a conscientious and constructive
manner. China itself suffered greatly from chemical weapons in the
past. Large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by Japanese
aggressor troops are found in China to this day, which still threaten
the safety and lives and the living environment of the local people.
China demands that, in keeping with the stipulations of the convention,
the country leaving chemical weapons in another country destroy
all such weapons as soon as possible. China hopes that the convention
will go into effect at an early date and be thoroughly and effectively
implemented, so as to free mankind as soon as possible from the
threat of chemical weapons and bring about a world free of such
weapons.
China has a massive civilian chemical industry. It is, however,
very cautious and responsible regards the export of chemicals that
could be used to manufacture chemical weapons and related technologies
and equipment, refusing such exports if they are to be used for
the purpose of manufacturing chemical weapons. In order to ensure
these items if exported not to be used in the production of chemical
weapons, the Chinese government has drafted regulations and measures
for the control of their exportation. A detailed list of chemicals
subject to export control has been drawn up in accordance with the
Verification Annex of the convention. Import and export of chemicals
on this list and technologies and equipment used in their manufacture
are under the centralized management of the Ministry of Chemical
Industry (MCI). Business related to such imports and exports is
handled by specialized enterprises designated by MCI and the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MCI, MOFTEC
and the General Administration of Customs (GAC) take joint responsibility
for examining and approving imports and exports, issuing licenses
and making inspections. China insists that the governments of importing
countries provide assurances that the relevant goods imported from
China not be used to manufacture chemical weapons or retransferred
to a third country.
China has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of
biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any
form by any country. In 1984 China acceded to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
and since that date it has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its
obligations under the convention. Since 1987 China has year after
year reported to the United Nations on convention-related information
and data in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences
of the convention. China supports measures that help strengthen
the effectiveness of the convention. It will actively join in discussions
of the Ad Hoc Group on promoting international cooperation, enhancing
trust, strengthening verification, and other issues. With regard
to the transfer of military equipment and related technology, China
respects the right of every country to self-defence aimed at safeguarding
its own security in accordance with the relevant principles contained
in the Charter of the United Nations, but at the same time it is
very concerned about the adverse effects on world security and regional
stability arising from excessive accumulations of weaponry.
For many years until the early 1980s, China did not engage in
weapons export trade, and since then the volume of such exports
has been limited. In accordance with a resolution by the UN General
Assembly, China participates in the United Nations register of conventional
arms transfers. As these records make clear, China's exports of
conventional weapons are only a small portion of those of the United
States, Russia, Britain, France or Germany.
China consistently adheres to a series of principles on conventional
weapons transfers. The export of such weapons should help the recipient
nation increase its appropriate defence capacity. The transfer must
not impair peace, safety or stability regionally or globally. China
does not use trade in weaponry to interfere in sovereign states'
internal affairs.
China strictly controls transfers of military equipment and related
technologies and has established an appropriate administrative organization
and operating mechanism to achieve this goal. The State Administrative
Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under the leadership
of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, is responsible
for the centralized control of transfers of military equipment and
related technologies. Its main function is drafting laws and policies
governing such transfers. It is mainly comprised of leading personnel
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Headquarters of the General
Staff, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defence, MOFTEC and other relevant departments. As the administrative
arm of the SACMPT, the State Bureau of Military Products Trade is
responsible for handling day-to-day affairs.
Governmental departments and companies engaged in transfers of
military equipment and technologies must be authorized, registered
and approved by the government. Their business activities must remain
strictly within the scope of operation approved. Contracts for transfer
of military equipment and technologies require approval before gaining
effect. Major transfer items and contracts must be examined by the
SACMPT and approved by the State Council and the Central Military
Commission. Stern legal sanctions shall be taken against any company
or individual who transfers military equipment and technologies
without proper governmental examination and approval.
The principles and measures to prevent the proliferation of weaponry
and unwarranted transfers of military equipment that China has consistently
upheld have helped preserve world peace and regional stability and
promote the healthy development of international arms control and
disarmament.
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