Jabin T. Jacob

(Assistant Director, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi)

Author

Jabin T. Jacob is Assistant Director and Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Assistant Editor of the academic journal, China Report. Jacob holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and has been a visiting scholar at universities in France and Singapore. Jacob's areas of interest include China and south Asia relations, Sino-Indian border areas, center provinces relations in China, and Chinese and Indian world views. He writes regularly for Indian media on Chinese domestic and foreign policies and on Sino-Indian relations.

Abstract

In history, the Silk Routes are closely associated with China, Central Asia and India. The Silk Routes were not just roads carrying goods and culture but as paths conveying power and influence. China's geographical advantages in Asia with land and sea borders with all the major players on the continent, coupled with its growing economic might, place it in the unique position of being an essential constituent of both regional and sub-regional economic development initiatives all around the continent. South Asia is no exception and this is evident from the fact that all three of the recently announced versions as well as older versions of China's Silk Routes need to have an India component in order to be successful.What are these Silk Routes that I am talking about? The northern Silk Route or the Silk Road Economic Belt cannot be limited only to a westerly direction onwards to Europe but must bring in the population centers of the south in Iran, Pakistan and India to truly take on the character of the Silk Routes of yore. The Iran axis of the northern Silk Route reaches the sea and revives historical connections with west Asia and India. The Karakoram Highway between China and Pakistan must be considered one of the first real revivals of the Silk Route in modern times. This axis of the northern Silk Route however, has been mired in problems for decades, owing to instability and poor economic development in Pakistan and has not lived up to Chinese expectations. One way to revive its usefulness would be if India-Pakistan relations were to improve and the KKH could also rely on feeder routes to Indian markets. India and China also have several sections of their long boundary that are not disputed. One such is the Karakoram Pass that sits at the tri-junction of Aksai Chin, Ladakh and Baltistan. There is also the Maritime Silk Route from China to its west which will touch important Indian cities on its way and which will inevitably depend on Indian resources for protection and order in the ocean. The other Silk Route, though not called such, is the BCIM Economic Corridor connecting China's southwest, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India's east. Each of these is a route with huge potential for China-India relations. From an Indian point of view, the important questions here are: What are the prime drivers of the Chinese attempts to revive the Silk Route and what have India's responses been? The first question is important to India in the light of its concerns about the overall strategic implications of China's ingress into India's close neighborhood. The answer to the second question will in turn reveal just how New Delhi perceives these Chinese initiatives. Answers to both questions are not free of ambiguities but as two large and rising powers in Asia, the questions need to be asked and ambiguous as the answers may be, they still serve a purpose in informing both sides of the necessity for greater openness in the relationship – a relationship of no small consequence to the rest of Asia.What are the opportunities that might be created to improve understanding and increase constructive engagement between China and India? In other words, what are the incentives both countries might have to undertake new, cross-border ventures, despite several unresolved issues in their relationship?