The report delivered by General Secretary Hu Jintao at the 17th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China laid out the new
objective of government reform to "accelerate the reform of the
administrative system and build a service-oriented government". Hu
said: "We will standardize the relationship between local
departments directly under central government organs and local
governments." Also called the "tiao kuai relationship", this has
always been an important part of the central-regional government
relationship.
Since China adopted its reform and opening up policies, the
country has decentralized more and more power to regional
governments, especially in the economic arena, to give full play to
regional initiatives. The authority, financial power and even
special privileges enjoyed by regional governments have expanded
remarkably, which has promoted regional economic development.
However, the congenital defects endemic to regional power, such
as partiality, shortsightedness and narrow-mindedness, have
generated local protectionism and problems such as smuggling,
draining of tax incomes, counterfeited products, fake statistics,
environmental deterioration and work safety accidents.
The complicated financial problems facing the country's market
economy should be dealt with comprehensively, and the national
environment requires the cultivation of a unified market. Regional
power is weak in resolving such problems and sometimes even becomes
an obstacle for the central government to execute solutions.
Given this background, vertical management has emerged and been
enhanced. It expands from traditional areas like customs and
security organs to new fields like taxation and environmental
protection departments. The latter were formerly controlled by
regional governments.
Vertical management has taken various forms: vertical management
by the central government, vertical management by the
provincial-level governments and special vertical management.
Security organizations, customs and national taxation organs, for
example, are managed by the central government.
Industry and commerce, local taxes, land use, quality
supervision, inspection and quarantine and food and drug
administration are managed by provincial-level governments.
The national land inspection, audit, financial inspection,
environmental protection enforcement supervision and inspection
teams sent by the National Bureau of Statistics fall under the
category of special vertical management, which is a new thing,
appearing with just the past few years.
This all shows that vertical management is being increasingly
intensified and expanded.
The relationship between local departments directly under
central government organs and local governments is an issue of
power distribution between central and regional governments.
The enhancement of vertical management will help break down
local protectionism, guarantee the smooth implementation of
policies and regulations, avoid intervention by regional
governments, optimize the allocation of resources and ensure the
maximum protection of national interests.
But vertical management is not a cure-all formula.
Vertical management departments cannot completely stamp out
intervention by local governments as there are multiple interest
relations and connections to consider. Vertical management will
weaken the functions of regional governments and affect their
initiatives. Vertical management departments may not cooperate with
regional governments in their work, and regional governments may be
slow to respond to centrally dictated initiatives. There will
easily be situations when each does things in its own way without
mutual coordination and both tend to shift responsibilities onto
others.
Affected by the trend of vertical management, departments under
regional governments may try to crowd themselves into vertical
systems, which would affect the stability of regional governments
and may result in some unpredictable problems in central-regional
government relations.
Thus the relationship should be regulated according to the
following principles:
First, all laws regulating the relationship between local
departments directly under central government organs and local
governments should be made within the framework of the
Constitution.
Second, a complete legal system is a prerequisite for the rule
of law. We need to complete our laws and regulations according to
the Constitution to regulate the division of power.
Third, the opinions of local governments should be taken into
consideration when the central government makes any adjustments.
Democratic decision-making is needed.
Last but not least, vertical management will only be rational
and practical when the functions are at the national or
trans-regional levels. Power is not always more effective when
wielded by the central government. Some regional functions can be
more effective when executed by local governments.
A few systems can be established out of respect for these
facts.
A scientific verification system, including expert and public
verification, should be set up. The central government should
conduct expert verifications before making decisions about
establishing a vertical management department. The statistics,
materials, process and results should be open to public
questioning. And a feedback mechanism should be built.
The democratic decision-making system should be enhanced. The
decision to set up vertical management departments by the central
government should be approved by the National People's Congress or
its Standing Committee before any concrete changes are made.
Xiong Wenzhao is a professor with Central University of
Nationalities, Cao Xudong is a graduate student of the
university
(China Daily December 21, 2007)