The development of agendas for cooperative action and the other main centers of global power forming part 8 of the National Security Strategy Report for the United States was submitted to US congress by President Bush on September 27. The report focuses on Russia, India and China, with China accounting for the larger portion of the paper. The so-called "other main centers of global power" refers to major powerful US allies including Europe and Asia in the first group, and Russia, India and China in the second. The US now regards Russia and India together with China indicating the increasing importance of these two countries since Sept.11. This article analyzes future developments in a study done on this report. The sections concerning China fully demonstrate the controversial nature of Bush's China policy, suggesting a fundamental tendency for the US's China policy to maintain a strategy of co-existing cooperation and confrontation.

On the one hand, the report admitted, "The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asian Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China." On the other hand, the report then goes on to say, "In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness."

According to the report, the US seeks a constructive relationship with changing China and already cooperates well where the two countries' interests overlap, such as on the war on terrorism, the Korean Peninsula, health and environmental problems. In addition, the report says "Sept.11 fundamentally changed the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power and opened vast, new opportunities with long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with leaders of Russia, India and China." The report recognizes the importance of China-US trade relations by pointing to the fact that China is now their fourth biggest trading partner with over US$100 billion in annual two-way trade. However the report also emphasizes profound disagreements with China, especially with regard to the US commitment to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relation Act, but also on issues relating human rights and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report considers critical the differences in political systems, yet holds that "We will narrow difference where they exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree."

Against the backdrop of anti-terrorism and Iraqi, partly because the US wants China's help in resolving Iraqi matter and partly because this section of the report centers mainly on US cooperation with the main centers of global power, the nature of China's threat seem somewhat reduced. References to China in this report appear less aggressive than those contained in a report by the US military, issued by US defense ministry, and a report on US-China trade relations which suggest a threat posed by China to US security, issued by the US congress. Nevertheless, the new US cold war approach towards China remains unchanged.

As mentioned above, although the report sees cooperation between the US and China on problems relating to anti-terrorism and some other issues, it still maintains a fundamental judgment that Sept.11 has not changed the nature of international relations in the East Asia region. The war on anti-terrorism has not changed the balance of power in East Asia. While the US devotes all its attention to handling the Middle East crisis and Iraq, it continues to try to maintain the status quo and reconfirm its promises to Taiwan. Considering the fact that China's purported military threat to the Asia-Pacific region is highlighted on page 27 of the report, and in view of the basic tone of the report, "The US will never allow other countries to surpass America's huge power and never allow other countries challenge the US's unique superpower status in the world," then the US's China policy is not at all what it asserts itself to be in part 8 of the document.

Although non-state terrorist organizations have posed serious threats to the security of all nations, including the US, this report seems to focus on nation-centered threats toward the US. In fact, it is understood that in Asia-Pacific region only China can seriously challenge the US's future. Within this context, the report actually regards China as a potential threat to the US, saying "the US force will be strong enough to block any potential enemy that seeks to surpass American military power or any attempts to achieve equal supremacy." China perceives this comment as a warning to itself.

The differences about China within the report reflect the controversy inside the Bush administration. There are now so many "new imperialists" in Pentagon, referring to themselves as "freedom fighters and democracy warriors" who want to change US foreign policy and the world itself. In this respect, so long as differences between the political systems of China and the US continue to exist, and as long as the rising trend of Chinese economic and military strength persists, the conflict between China and the new American imperialists could prove to be a long story.

What's more, if these new imperialists are those who insist on aggressive realism, as opposed to defensive realism, and persevere in preventing perceived threats with pre-emptive measures, then Sino-US relations may well face a new and significant crisis just beyond the horizon, especially if relations deteriorate in the Taiwan Straits.

Since the release of the report, international commentators view the policy of pre-emptive strikes as a euphemism for the US giving up traditional strategies of containment and deterrence. However, we must note that while the report emphasizes a policy of first strike, it still holds that America's military power must first attempt to prevent threat posed to the US, its allies and its friends. Even in the Bush administration, where many new imperialists and aggressive realists occupy leading positions, there are still a number of defensive realists who continue to insist on the benefits of deterrence and containment. Obviously, US containment and deterrence has not been completely replaced by the notion of pre-emptive strikes. Instead, the two notions appear to be operating along side one another. As for the US's China policy, the old strategy of containment has not changed, but the notion of a pre-emptive strike has been added to allow for developments which may arise over the question of Taiwan.

The author, Pang Zhongying, is a well-known Chinese scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

(china.org.cn, translated by Zheng Guihong, October 18, 2002)