At a time when the Afghanistan War is drawing to en end and the
whole world is wanting to know whether US forces can finally catch
Bin Laden, on December 11, the United States sent out the shocking
news: the White House has decided to formally notify Russia in a
few days that the United States will withdraw from the ABM Treaty
(Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) it signed in 1972.
The spread of the news has stunned the world. This not only
represents the US withdrawal from an important international
agreement for the first time since the end of World War II in 1945,
but also implies the disintegration of the international mechanism
for prohibiting strategic defense that has continued for almost 30
years.
Withdrawing from ABM: the Bush Administration Once Again Wields the
"Unilateralism" Magic Weapon
After the September 11 terrorist incident, the United States and
Russia swiftly "got close" to each other, the all-round cooperation
provided by Russia to the United States in the latter's Afghanistan
War and other anti-terrorist actions is the key factor making it
possible for the United States to defeat Taliban within 62 days. In
the US future anti-terrorism actions, Russia's cooperation will
absolutely play a significant role. Therefore, judged from the
situation featuring the rapid improvement of US-Russian relations
after the Afghanistan War, the United States should have found it
hard to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
Now, the US sudden declaration of its plan to withdraw from the
ABM, without a doubt, means a heavy blow stricken by US
unilateralism to the international community who have been
concerned about and in opposition to the US unilateral deployment
of the missile defense system.
On
November 2, 2001, the General Assembly of the 56th United Nations
just passed the resolution entitled "Maintaining and Observing the
ABM Treaty by an overwhelming majority with 80 votes for and three
votes against, which reiterated the spirit of the related
resolutions passed by the General Assembly in December 1999, called
on the signatory states to strictly observe the contents of the
treaty, refrain from deploying and transferring the anti missile
weaponry system and safeguard the completeness and effectiveness of
the ABM Treaty. Now, it is only three months after the occurrence
of the September 11 incident when the international community is
helping the United States in winning the Afghanistan War, the
United States once again turns a deaf ear to the just voice of the
international community, this cannot but once again generate a deep
impression on the people about the US international behavior which
is "full of hegemonic air".
US-Russian Negotiation on the Anti-Missile Issue Will Not End
However, for US-Russian relations, the question is not so simple.
The US sudden use of the "withdrawal-from-treaty" mace,
superficially, has not only discredited President Putin, but also
spelled a scratching satire on Putin who devotes great efforts to
improving relations with the United States. Interestingly, Western
media reports say Russia has recently told the United States that
if the latter withdraws from the ABM Treaty, US-Russia relations
will not be thus harmed; this implies that US withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty will not cause Russia's strong reaction and there is no
need to worry about excessive diplomatic cost incurred from
breaking off the ABM.
A
reasonable explanation is that the Bush administration's present
decision to choose withdrawal from the ABM actually is, in itself,
the result of the US-Russian anti-missile negotiation since the
previous six months, as well as the result of the new development
of US-Russian relations after the September 11 incident.
First, it is the hope of President Putin that his policy of making
concession to the United States on the issue of the ABM Treaty has
always met with strong opposition from domestic military and
left-wing political forces. If Russia easily agrees to revision of
the ABM Treaty, it would mean a heavy blow to the Putin
administration's domestic political prestige and its power
foundation. In order to balance various domestic forces and voices,
it is already very difficult for Putin to be convinced of making
major concession on the anti-missile issue. The US present
announcement of withdrawal from the ABM has made it possible to
maintain the rock-firm image of the Putin administration's
determination to maintain the anti-missile treaty.
Second, On November 13, at the summit talks in White House, Russia
and the United States announced their plan to make a large-scale
cut of strategic nuclear weapons to the level of 1,700-2,200
missiles. If Russia wants to maintain the reliability of its
strategic nuclear power in terms of magnitude, there is all the
more no reason for it to make concessions to the United States.
Given this, it is likely that Russia will think that there is
smaller room for choice on the ABM issue after attainment of the
initial objective of in-depth nuclear disarmament, and it will even
more be unwilling to openly agree to revision of the ABM Treaty. In
other words, in order to strive for the signing of a treaty by the
United States and Russia on the large-scale reduction of offensive
strategic nuclear weapons in the new stage, Russia cannot but
"acquiesce" in the US attempt to break through the restriction
imposed by the ABM on its deployment of the NMD system by the
method of "withdrawal from the Treaty".
The United States still has continued diplomatic expectation of
Russia through "withdrawing from the Treaty", that is, it hopes,
through this tough method of the United States, to speed up its
diplomatic negotiation with Russia on the anti-missile issue, so
that it can discuss the signing of a new disarmament agreement to
"replace", not "revise" the ABM Treaty. Of course, this
"substitution" treaty will comply with US demands to the maximum,
so as to enable the United States to bypass the restraints which
are likely impossible to side step under the circumstance of
revising the ABM Treaty. Similarly, it is likely that Putin "cannot
but" choose to allow the United States to first declare breaking
off the Treaty, then through a new round of Russian-US negotiation
to fulfill, in a "curve" way, the task of the revision of the
US-Russian ABM Treaty or of substituting the "old treaty" with a
"new treaty". For this, it is likely that the United States and
Russia would sign a new military control agreement in summer next
year.
In
short, the United States' choice of this time to declare breaking
off the treaty, to a large extent, is the result of the fact that
both the United States and Russia have already had a "base line".
But this is essentially different from the US August declaration of
its plan to withdraw from the treaty.
America's Intention
The "September 11 incident" and the US anti-terrorism" military
actions have, without a doubt, enhanced the Bush administration's
sense of urgency in speeding up development and deployment of the
NMD system and have, to a certain extent, strengthened the US
domestic persuasion in the establishment of the NMD system. The
Bush administration, of course, will not miss this political
opportunity for pushing forward its missile defense program. On
December 11, in his speech delivered in a military academy in
Carolina state, Bush explicitly said that the NMD system is an
"effective means" for anti-terrorism" action. At the same time, the
poll support rate for Bush witnessed a sharp rise after the
"September 11 incident". A recent survey shows that the poll
approval rate for Bush has reached 90 percent, the supporting rate
for his diplomatic policy has also reached 75 percent. Such a
"golden" domestic supporting rate has spurred Bush to make up his
mind to declare breaking off the ABM Treaty without avoiding the
opposition of his political opponents and divergent domestic
opinions.
"Withdrawing from the treaty" is the first choice for the United
States. No matter how the ABM Treaty will be revised, the United
States will be subject to its restriction. The ABM Treaty is
invariably a hindrance to the Bush administration that already has
a colossal missile defense development plan and is bent on
realizing its deployment as quickly as possible. As a matter of
fact, the United States had planned to break off the ABM Treaty as
early as August 2001 and had set the deadline for this in December.
The Bush administration's major worry about its choice of
"withdrawing from the treaty" was Russia's reaction. Now that the
United States and Russia have established a "new relationship" in
their anti-terrorism" cooperation, and Russia has agreed to get
away from the shadow of Cold War together with the United States
and eliminate the remnants of the Cold War, so it is now the "best"
time for the United States to decide to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. After the withdrawal, the United States can go ahead with
the establishment of the NMD system without scruple.
Bush's decision to "withdraw from the treaty" indicates an end to
the White House's debate on policies on the anti-missile issue. But
it means a telling blow to US Secretary of State Colin Powell's
policy idea and his personal policy status. Powell always advocates
revising the Treaty through negotiation with Russia, but
maintenance of the ABM Treaty can also allow the United States to
deploy a certain kind of anti-missile system. In contrast, "the
hawk", represented by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, has
once again taken the upper hand in policy decision, National
Security Affairs Advisor Condoleeza Rice stands on the side of
Rumsfeld in the present choice. The New York Times said openly on
December 12 that "withdrawal from the treaty" represents Rumsfeld's
victory.
History sometimes is good at playing jokes. In 1976, it was
Rumsfeld, who held the post of Secretary of Defense in the then
Ford administration, ordered the closure of the anti-missile base
in north Dakota state; 25 years afterwards, when Rumsfeld again
serves as the defense secretary, he declares re-establishing the US
missile defense base and he himself spells an end to the ABM Treaty
that has existed for 30 years. Will "withdrawal from the treaty"
really represent Rumsfeld's "victory"? History will give the
answer.
(
December 14, 2001)